Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

WFP World Food Programme

Hunger Hotspots

FAO–WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity

November 2024 to May 2025 outlook

Global Network Against Food Crises
INTEGRATED ACTIONS FOR LASTING SOLUTIONS

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Early warning hunger hotspots
November 2024 to May 2025

Key drivers and aggravating factors

Conflict/insecurity · Displacement · Dry conditions · Economic shocks · Flood · Political instability/unrest · Tropical cyclone



Hotspots of highest concern[1]

Hotspots of very high concern[2]

Hotspots[3]

An icon applies both if the shock (for example, dry conditions) is forecast to take place during the outlook period, or if the shock already occurred, but will impact food security over the outlook period.

The displacement icon applies when it is a key driver of food insecurity or a significant factor underlying vulnerability. It applies to internally displaced people, migrants and refugees.

[1] This category includes hotspots with Famine or Risk of Famine, with populations already in Catastrophe (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC]/Cadre Harmonisé [CH]); and hotspots at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions, i.e. where an extremely vulnerable population in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is facing severely worsening contextual drivers and access constraints, which indicate the possibility of a further deterioration and possible occurrence of catastrophic conditions in the outlook period.

[2] These are hotspots where sizeable populations – over 500 000 people or more than 10 percent of the population analysed (when at least 50 percent of the population have been analysed) – are estimated or projected to be facing Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 4) or are identified as severely acute food insecure as per the WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) methodology; the number of people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or severe acute food insecurity (based on WFP's CARI methodology) is expected to increase during the outlook period as based on latest data available; and contextual drivers are likely to further deteriorate.

[3] Other countries/territories, in which acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate further during the outlook period, and which were identified as hunger hotspots.

Source of data: WFP and FAO. 2024. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (November 2024 to May 2025)*. Rome. Source of map: United Nations Geospatial. 2023. Map of the World. In: *United Nations*. [Cited 7 October 2024]. https://www.un.org/geospatial/content/map-world-1

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Abbreviations

CARI	Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security
CH	Cadre Harmonisé
ENSO	El Niño-Southern Oscillation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
GAM	global acute malnutrition
GNAFC	Global Network Against Food Crises
GHO	Global Humanitarian Overview
IMF	International Monetary Fund
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
HNRP	Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan
IDP	internally displaced person
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MSSM	Multinational Security Support Mission
NSAG	non-state armed group
rCARI	remote Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security
SBA	Sana'a based authorities
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations Refugee Agency
WASH	water, sanitation and hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

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Executive summary

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) warn that acute food insecurity is projected to worsen across 16 hunger hotspots during the outlook period from November 2024 to May 2025, including a total of 14 countries and 2 regional clusters which comprise 8 countries. **The Sudan, Palestine, South Sudan, Haiti and Mali remain at the highest concern level.** These are countries/territories with Famine or Risk of Famine, or with populations already in Catastrophe (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC]/Cadre Harmonisé [CH] Phase 5), **necessitating the most urgent attention**.

Chad, Lebanon, Myanmar, Mozambique, Nigeria, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen are classified as hotspots of very high concern, where large numbers of people are facing or are projected to face critical levels of acute food insecurity. This situation is driven by escalating factors that threaten to deepen already life-threatening conditions. Since the May 2024 edition, **Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia and the Niger have been added to the hunger hotspots list, while Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Malawi, Somalia, Zambia and Zimbabwe** remain designated as hunger hotspots.

This report focuses on the most severe and deteriorating acute hunger situations, but **it does not represent all countries/territories experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity**.

Conflict and armed violence continue to be the primary drivers of hunger in numerous hotspots, disrupting food systems, displacing populations, and obstructing humanitarian access.

The conflict in the **Sudan** is likely to expand during the outlook, driving mass displacement, resulting in famine levels likely to persist and the number of people in catastrophic conditions to increase. A likely intensification will further aggravate the regional humanitarian crisis, resulting in increased cross-border movements to neighbouring countries, primarily Chad, South Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Ethiopia and the Central African Republic.

In the Near East and North Africa region, the ongoing conflict in **Palestine** has driven unprecedented needs, with near-total displacement of the population and an increased risk of regional spillover. In **Lebanon**, the ongoing escalation of conflict is significantly increasing the number of people requiring humanitarian assistance and is severely impacting levels of acute food insecurity. In turn, this is exacerbating needs in the **Syrian Arab Republic** by driving a surge of Syrian returnees in adverse conditions and triggering major economic repercussions. In **Yemen**, conflict is aggravating an already dire financial situation and constraining food assistance.

In the Horn of Africa, insecurity is likely to cause severe access constraints especially in **Somalia** and **Ethiopia**, while intercommunal conflict will continue to restrict market access, livelihood opportunities and humanitarian access in **South Sudan**.

In Central Sahel, violence perpetrated by non-state armed groups and rising insecurity continue to escalate. In **Mali**, acute food insecurity has reached catastrophic levels for segments of the population in the north due to violence and very high access constraints. The violence also extends to northern and eastern **Burkina Faso**. **Chad** is facing conflict and insecurity compounded by an influx of refugees from the Sudan, while northern **Nigeria** grapples with a deteriorating security environment. In Southern Africa, persisting conflict in the north is expected to increase acute food insecurity in **Mozambique**. Meanwhile, intense fighting in **Myanmar** is likely to deepen the economic crisis. In Latin America, escalating violence in **Haiti** is pushing displaced populations back into starvation, with pockets of population already experiencing catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity.

Beyond conflict, **weather extremes** and increased climate variability are exacerbating acute food insecurity in many regions. **La Niña, expected to persist through March 2025**, will significantly impact rainfall patterns and temperatures. While La Niña may enhance agricultural prospects in some areas, it also increases the risk of flooding in parts of **Nigeria**, **Malawi**, **Mozambique**, **South Sudan**, **Zambia** and **Zimbabwe**. Conversely, La Niña is likely to bring drier-than-average conditions to southern and southeastern **Ethiopia**, eastern **Kenya**, and all of **Somalia**. Given the uncertainties in current forecasts, continuous monitoring of projections and their impacts on agricultural production and livelihoods is essential.

Global economic disparities and high debt levels in many developing countries/territories are undermining governments' capacity to shield their populations from poverty and climate shocks. Despite slight declines in global interest rates, many governments remain fiscally constrained. Ongoing conflict in the Near East, with the risk of a regional escalation with spillovers to further countries, remain a major risk for the global economy over the outlook period. Additionally, currency depreciation and food import restrictions could result in rising food prices in vulnerable countries already grappling with climate shocks and political instability.

If anticipated reductions in funding for emergency agriculture, food, and livelihood assistance occur, they are expected to exacerbate conditions in several hunger hotspots. **Immediate and scaled-up assistance is crucial in all 16 hunger hotspots to protect livelihoods and improve access to food**. Decision-makers must increase funding for humanitarian assistance, and intensify diplomatic efforts to improve humanitarian access and end conflict. They should also invest in early action to address the root causes of acute food insecurity, rather than waiting for further deteriorations in areas already classified as being in Crisis or Emergency (IPC/CH Phases 3 or 4), or where excess mortality and morbidity have been alarmingly high for prolonged periods. Early intervention saves lives, reduces food gaps and protects assets and livelihoods at a significantly lower cost than delayed humanitarian action.

Without immediate humanitarian efforts and concerted international action to address severe access constraints and advocate for the de-escalation of conflict and insecurity, further starvation and loss of life are likely in Palestine, the Sudan, South Sudan, Haiti and Mali.

Addressing and preventing famine in these regions will require greater investment in integrated solutions that cut across traditional mandates, targeting the root causes of food insecurity and reducing dependency on emergency aid.

This report outlines country-specific recommendations for urgent emergency responses, as well as anticipatory actions to meet existing humanitarian needs and implement short-term protective interventions before new crises emerge.


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Introduction

For the outlook period of November 2024 to May 2025, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) are issuing an early warning for urgent humanitarian action in 16 hunger hotspots, covering a total of 22 countries/territories, including 2 regional clusters spanning 8 countries. In the hunger hotspots, parts of the population will likely face a significant deterioration of already high levels of acute food insecurity, putting lives and livelihoods at risk.

Identified through forward-looking analysis, these hotspots have the potential for acute food insecurity to rise significantly during the outlook period, under the effects of multiple overlapping drivers, interlinked or mutually reinforcing. These fall under the categories of conflict and organized violence, economic shocks, weather extremes and climate variability.

The countries/territories covered in this report highlight the most significant, likely deteriorations of acute hunger expected in the outlook period but do not represent all situations with high levels of acute food insecurity.

Targeted humanitarian action is urgently needed to save lives and livelihoods in all 16 hunger hotspots. In the Sudan, Palestine, South Sudan, Haiti and Mali humanitarian action remains critical to prevent starvation and death.

To this end, the present report provides country-specific recommendations on priorities for:

- anticipatory action – short-term protective interventions to be implemented before new humanitarian needs materialize; and
- emergency response – actions to address existing and emerging humanitarian needs.

Anticipatory actions are short-term disaster risk management interventions implemented during the critical time window between an early warning trigger – the point in time when forecasts show that a hazard is likely to occur in the future – and the actual impact of the forecast hazard on lives and livelihoods. The objective is to protect the most vulnerable people and their livelihoods from the expected impacts of the hazard.

This report features recommendations for anticipatory actions and emergency response actions, tailored to the flagged risks. Anticipatory action recommendations are only included if the risk analysis indicates a hazard/shock that has yet to materialize in the outlook period. When a hazard/shock has already affected agricultural livelihoods and food security, the window of opportunity for anticipatory action is considered closed, even if the impacts of the hazard/shock are expected to continue in the present and the future. In such cases, only emergency response recommendations are made in this report.

Recognizing the role that anticipatory action can play in protracted crises, anticipatory action recommendations are included in such contexts, when appropriate, if the aim of the actions is to mitigate the impact of a new hazard or shock, rather than addressing pre-existing humanitarian needs and underlying vulnerabilities.

Considering the long outlook period of 7 months featured in this report, the anticipatory actions listed are indicative and would only be suggested for implementation if a trigger is reached or clear early warning signs manifest. Some recommendations also refer to preparedness activities, which are always critical for the effective and timely implementation of anticipatory actions.

The selection of hunger hotspots is based on consensus among food security experts and conflict, economic and natural hazards analysts from both FAO and WFP, at headquarters and in the field. The process is informed by an initial prioritization, using a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators that include:

- latest absolute figures (projections, where available) of people in Crisis or worse (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC]/Cadre Harmonisé [CH] Phase 3 or above) and the prevalence of levels of acute food insecurity among the analysed population, as well as the year-on-year trend of both absolute figures and prevalence;
- forward-looking risk analysis of key drivers of acute food insecurity, namely conflict and political violence, economic shocks and natural hazards;
- ongoing or planned agricultural activities for the outlook period, and existing or likely disruptions caused by the above-mentioned contextual risks; and
- aggravating factors, such as humanitarian access constraints, levels of acute malnutrition, lack of national coping capacity, displacement, and the incidence of animal and plant pests and diseases.

The report prioritizes the use of IPC and CH as data sources on Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). When recent IPC/CH data are not available, acute food insecurity estimates are derived from IPC-compatible Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) analyses, or categorization of WFP's Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Insecurity (CARI). Populations that are classified as "moderately acute food insecure" and "severely acute food insecure", as per WFP's CARI methodology, are reported as an approximation to populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). This also stands for its application to remotely collected data (rCARI). FEWS NET and IPC use the same scale, although FEWS NET figures may differ as it uses a different approach. Other sources utilized are Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNO) and Humanitarian Response Plans (HRP).

The acute food insecurity figures presented in this report for Ethiopia, Myanmar and the Syrian Arab Republic are extracted from HNO/HRP estimates of people in need of food and livelihood assistance. For Ethiopia, these are based on a combination of Household Economy Analysis, Displacement Tracking Matrix and Village Assessment Survey. For Myanmar, IPC-equivalent analysis has been conducted for the June 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) addendum. For the Syrian Arab Republic, estimates are based on WFP's CARI methodology. For Zimbabwe and Yemen, the figures are based on FEWS NET's projected population in need of urgent food assistance. For all the other countries where data are available, acute food insecurity figures are based on IPC/CH.

The cutoff date for the analysis and information in this report was October 25. 2024.

This report is part of a series of analytical products produced under the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) initiative, to enhance and coordinate the generation and sharing of evidence-based information and analysis for preventing and addressing food crises. In April 2024, the GNAFC, in collaboration with the Food Security Information Network, released the Global Report on Food Crises 2024, which reports the number of people estimated to be in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) and the prevalence of these numbers within the analysed population in 59 countries/territories with food crisis situations in 2023. The 2024 Mid-Year Update of the Global Report on Food Crises was published in September. The reports are available at https://www.fightfoodcrises.net and https://www.fsinplatform.org.

IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives

PHASE	TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION	PRIORITY RESPONSE OBJECTIVE
1 None/Minimal	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Resilience building and disaster risk reduction.
2 Stressed	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Disaster risk reduction and protection of livelihoods.
3 Crisis	Households either: • Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; OR • Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	**URGENT ACTION REQUIRED** to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps.
4 Emergency	Some households either: • Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; OR • Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.	**URGENT ACTION REQUIRED** to save lives and livelihoods.
5 Catastrophe/ Famine*	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality).	**URGENT ACTION REQUIRED** to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods.

* Some households can be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) even if areas are not classified as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5). Given the severity and implications of classifying Famine, specific IPC protocols have been developed, and special considerations are identified in the IPC Technical Manual 3.1 (see pp. 24–25 for more details on criteria: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en).
A Famine classification requires evidence on food security, nutrition and mortality at or above IPC/CH Phase 5 thresholds. Depending on the quality and quantity of evidence available, Famine can be classified as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) with solid evidence or as Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) with reasonable evidence.

Upcoming trends of acute food insecurity drivers

To identify hunger hotspots, FAO and WFP have assessed how key drivers of acute food insecurity are likely to evolve and their potential combined effects across countries/territories in the coming months; the related risks of deterioration were also gauged. Below is an overview of key findings.

Organized violence and conflict risks

With a proliferation of conflict events and the involvement of state and non-state actors, one in seven people worldwide was estimated to be exposed to armed violence in mid-2024 – a 64 percent increase compared to 4 years ago.[1] The direct and indirect impacts of conflict, violence and political instability are far-reaching, resulting in countries suffering from higher socioeconomic vulnerability, less coping capacity, and greater exposure to the effects of natural hazards.[2] Food security is particularly affected, with conflict causing the destruction of livestock and croplands, driving forced displacement, disrupting livelihoods and income, limiting market access, and resulting in price fluctuations and erratic food production and consumption.[3] Access restrictions, driven by intense fighting, shifting frontlines, and bureaucratic impediments, are making it increasingly difficult for humanitarian organizations to provide vital assistance.

In 14 out of the 16 hunger hotspots highlighted in this report, armed violence is identified as a key driver of acute food insecurity, often compounded by economic challenges and extreme weather events. The report also highlights how the effects of conflict increasingly spread beyond borders, prompting cross-border population movement as well as regional and global economic implications.

One year since the escalation, military operations in the **Gaza Strip** continue to drive unprecedented needs and a risk of famine, while violence levels and economic challenges are also increasing in the West Bank. In **Lebanon**, the ongoing escalation of conflict will significantly increase the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance, and will have a severe impact on levels of acute food insecurity, while raising the risk of a regional escalation. Spillovers are likely particularly for the **Syrian Arab Republic**, both in terms of violence and refugee flows, adding to the economic deterioration which is already constraining access to food.[4] In **Yemen**, localized conflict is exacerbating the dire financial situation and limiting food assistance.

The conflict in the **Sudan** is likely to continue expanding in the outlook, driving further mass displacement. Coupled with the deepening economic crisis and extreme constraints on humanitarian access, there is a risk of famine levels to persist and the number of people in catastrophic conditions to increase. Intensifying conflict will further aggravate the already severe regional humanitarian crisis, as cross-border movements to neighbouring states – primarily Chad, South Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia – are expected to continue increasing. New spikes are expected with the end of the rainy season by November. In the **Horn of Africa**, insecurity is likely to persist across parts of the region causing severe access constraints especially in Somalia and Ethiopia and compounding the impacts of a forecast below-average rainfall season. In **South Sudan**, intercommunal conflict will continue to restrict market access, livelihood opportunities and humanitarian access.

The ongoing humanitarian crisis in **Central Sahel** is likely to persist, with indications of escalating violence by non-state armed groups (NSAGs). In **Mali**, conflict-driven access constraints already caused Catastrophe levels of acute food insecurity among populations in the north. Constraints on population movements and humanitarian access remain extreme in northern and eastern **Burkina Faso**. **Chad** is likely to continue facing conflict and insecurity in the Lac region driving displacement and disrupting agriculture, in addition to rising arrivals from the Sudan. In **Nigeria**, amid a worsening security situation in northern states, unabated high inflation and weakening currency will continue to drive food insecurity. Persisting conflict in Cabo Delgado province and severe weather events induced by La Niña are likely to compound agricultural losses and drive up food inflation in **Mozambique**.

In Asia, intense fighting in **Myanmar** is likely to continue deepening the economic crisis and driving up already high displacement levels, including cross-border movements to neighbouring countries.

Latin America remains a region with widespread exposure to violence, with **Haiti** standing out as persisting high levels of armed violence drive food inflation, challenge access and resulting in re-emerging catastrophic acute food insecurity for some areas.

Natural hazard risks

The El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) alert system status is at La Niña Watch. As of the beginning of October 2024, there is a 60 percent chance of La Niña developing between September and November 2024, and is expected to persist through January–March 2025. This climatic shift could exacerbate droughts and heatwaves in vulnerable regions while increasing the risk of flooding in others.[5]

Countries identified in this report as **Highest Concern** are expected to face climate-related risks worsened by La Niña. In **Mali**, heavy rainfall observed in September, likely related with La Niña, led to floods that directly impacted over 544 000 hectares of cropland and potentially limited humanitarian access, further aggravating food insecurity, especially in the central-southern regions.[6] Both **South Sudan** and the **Sudan** have experienced severe floods, and with above-average precipitation forecasted in southern South Sudan and in neighbouring countries during the period from October to December, South Sudan may face further negative impacts. This could disrupt the maize harvest, affect the maturation phase of sorghum, cause infrastructure damage, and hinder assistance to displaced populations.[7] In **Haiti**, the 85 percent likelihood of an above-normal Atlantic Hurricane Season for 2024 (June to November), combined with the La Niña conditions, increases the risk of heavy rains, severe storms, and flooding, potentially causing extensive crop damage and losses, and exacerbating the ongoing economic and food crisis.[8, 9]

Countries categorized as **Very High Concern** are projected to face multiple risks, influenced in part by La Niña. In **Myanmar**, the monsoon rains expected until the end of October have already caused floods in the southern part of the country, along with damages related to the floods caused by Tropical Cyclone Yagi in the north. This situation may potentially worsen conditions particularly in conflict-affected areas.[10, 11] In **Chad**, widespread floods in August and September affected 1.9 million people as of early October, and caused the loss of 356 000 hectares of cropland,[12] contributed to a forecast below-average 2024 cereal harvest.[13] The current river levels in 2024 are higher than those observed in both 2022 and 2023, indicating a heightened risk of riverine flooding.[14] In **the Niger**, heavy rains beginning in May have caused the worst flooding in the country since 2020,[15] affecting 1.3 million people as of end-September 2024.[16] The floods have severely disrupted livelihoods, thereby exacerbating acute food insecurity across the country, particularly in the conflict-affected regions of Tillabéri, Taboua, Diffa and Maradi.[17] In **Nigeria**, deadly floods in the north, combined with expected above-average rainfall in the Sahel and southern regions related to La Niña, may increase rainfall and flooding along the Niger River, particularly between October and November, making the food security crisis more critical.[18] **Mozambique** faces the threat of more active cyclone seasons from November to April, with severe storms and potential flooding likely to disrupt agriculture, which could aggravate the food insecurity situation in areas affected by poor harvests due to El Niño-induced drought. However, while La Niña forecasts predict normal to above-normal rainfall, which could help boost crop production, the risk of flooding remains a significant concern. In **Yemen,** dry conditions are expected to worsen the already critical food security situation, with below-average rainfall anticipated between October 2024 and February 2025.[19] Meanwhile, floods between July and September 2024 caused widespread damage to infrastructure and displacement. Although average to below-average rainfall is expected during the outlook period, the risk of flash floods remains high due to swollen rivers and waterlogged soil, particularly in areas with poor drainage.[20, 21, 22]

Other hotspots vulnerable to La Niña impacts may experience various climate effects during the outlook period. In **East Africa** (Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia), floods in late 2023 and early 2024 have caused significant damage to crop and infrastructure. Looking ahead, rainfall deficit is expected, with below-average rains forecasted from October to December in southern and southeastern Ethiopia, all of Somalia, and eastern Kenya, which will have several effects on agriculture and livestock.[23] Following widespread and intense drought experienced earlier in 2024, countries in **Southern Africa** (Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) face flood risks reflecting forecasts of above-average rainfall, while Namibia is expected to continue experiencing drier-than-normal conditions.[24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29]

Among the countries for monitoring, in **Madagascar**, La Niña could intensify cyclone activity, leading to flooding, while heavy rains may intensify locust invasions. The **Central African Republic** expects continued floods followed by drought, further straining food production.

Economic risk

The International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s Global Economic Outlook projects global economic growth to remain at 3.2 percent in 2024 and increase slightly to 3.3 percent in 2025.[30] Asia's emerging market economies continue to be the main engine driving the global economy, with upward revisions in growth for India and China, which together account for almost half of global growth in 2024. However, there are significant differences among developing countries, with Asia growing at more than double the pace of Latin America and major African economies like Nigeria.

According to the World Bank, 712 million people were living below the US dollar 2.15 extreme-poverty line in 2022, a number still higher than pre-pandemic levels.[31] It is only in 2023 that the figure is projected to drop below pre-pandemic levels, with an estimated 691 million people – 8.6 percent of the global population – expected to be living in extreme poverty.[32] This indicates that almost no progress has been made in reducing poverty since 2019, and without the pandemic, poverty levels today would likely be significantly lower. Furthermore, while in most countries global poverty rates have steadily decreased after peaking in 2020, fragile and conflict-affected countries, as well as low-income countries, experienced a new increase in poverty in 2023.[33] This highlights a growing income gap between poor countries and the rest of the world.

Many countries worldwide continue to struggle with high debt levels.[34] The economic scarring of the pandemic, conflicts, and the rise in global interest rates since 2022 have hit low-income countries hard. The median low-income country is now spending over twice as much on debt service to foreign creditors as a share of revenue than it did 10 years ago – roughly 14 percent at the end of 2023 compared to 6 percent a decade earlier.[35] The high debt servicing needs can divert limited resources away from investments in programmes that promote sustainable and equitable growth, and social services that protect vulnerable populations. An estimated 3.3 billion people live in countries that spend more on interest payments than on either education or health.[36] Moreover, in emerging and developing countries, interest payments outweigh climate investments, thus slowing down efforts toward climate change adaptation and mitigation.[37]

With inflation levels in the United States gradually slowing, the Federal Reserve began introducing interest rate cuts in September 2024, slightly easing pressure on developing countries.[38] The resulting weakening of the US dollar since early September is expected to improve current account and debt positions and strengthen currencies in several low and middle-income countries. However, this relief is likely to be limited, as interest rates are expected to remain higher than pre-pandemic levels for the foreseeable future.

Ongoing conflict in the Near East, with the risk of a regional escalation with spillovers to further countries, remain a major risk for the global economy over the outlook period.[39] After spiking earlier in the year, oil prices have decreased significantly, primarily due to slowing growth in major economies such as the United States.[40]

Ongoing tensions in the Red Sea have compromised the security of global supply chains, prompting a rerouting away from the

Suez Canal[41] – one of the world's critical trade chokepoints and a vital source of foreign exchange for Egypt[42] – toward longer alternative routes to mitigate the risk of attacks. This is compounded by disruptions from the persistent drought that restricted navigation through the Panama Canal between early 2023 and mid-2024.[43] Combined, these disruptions have not only increased transportation costs and transit times,[44] but also highlighted the vulnerability of global trade to future climate and conflict-related shocks, potentially driving food prices even higher in the long run.

As of September 2024,[45] the FAO Food Price Index was 2.1 percent higher year-on-year and 3 percent above the previous month — the largest month-on-month increase since March 2022. However, it remains 22.4 percent below its peak from March 2022. Price quotations for all commodities included in the index strengthened in September. While global prices moderated throughout 2023 and most of 2024 compared to the previous 2 years, local factors — particularly currency depreciations — are sustaining high prices in many countries, making it increasingly difficult for poor households to afford essential food items.

Regional ramifications of the crisis in the Sudan

Eighteen months into the conflict, fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, along with allied armed groups, shows no sign of restraint. In recent months, violence has spread to additional Sudanese states, as previously warned, with devastating impacts on civilian populations. With no political solution in sight, the conflict is expected to continue well beyond the end of 2024, driving further large-scale displacement and destruction within the Sudan and into neighbouring countries, deepening an already large regional humanitarian crisis.

In the Sudan, hostilities are likely to further intensify and expand during the outlook period, affecting other areas that have so far been less impacted, such as Blue Nile and White Nile states. Meanwhile, violence is expected to persist in the Kordofan region as well as in Khartoum and the north-central states. In North Darfur, the battle for the capital El Fasher, which has been raging since early May 2024, is likely to be prolonged due to the high stakes for both sides.[46]

Driven by conflict, economic collapse, famine, and the deterioration or complete breakdown in some areas of key public services, the displacement crisis in the Sudan, both within its borders and into neighbouring countries, will grow even further. The Sudan has already become the largest and fastest-growing displacement crisis in the world. By the beginning of October, the number of people displaced reached the new high of nearly 11.3 million, approximately 2.5 million more compared to the previous Hunger Hotspots report.[47] The vast majority, 8.1 million people, are displaced internally, another 2.9 million are displaced to neighbouring countries, the large majority being Sudanese refugees moving to Chad and Egypt, and South Sudanese returning to South Sudan. Arrivals have been increasing also in Central African Republic as well as in Libya and in Uganda, countries that were included for the first time in July 2024 into the revised United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan.[48] Most new arrivals from the Sudan to neighbouring countries are in a poor nutritional state.[49]

Refugees, returnees and other nationals will continue fleeing into the Sudan's neighbouring countries during the outlook period, following various trends and driving increasing humanitarian needs across the region, which will intensify competition over limited resources. Overall, by the end of 2024, according to UNHCR revised projections of July 2024, South Sudan and Chad will continue receiving the largest influx – South Sudan primarily receiving returnees and Chad mainly receiving refugees.[50]

By end 2024, nearly 1.3 million people are expected to cross the border into **Chad**, up from the almost 646 000 displaced as of mid-September.[51] Inflow of populations is expected to see new spikes after the rainy season ends in October.[52] Similarly, new arrivals to **South Sudan** are likely to spike with the end of rainy season. There is growing risk of significant increase in arrivals if conflict in the Sudan intensifies in the highly populated Blue Nile and White Nile states, triggering larger movements into South Sudan through the Renk and Maban entry points.[53]

By the end September, the Government of **Egypt** reported a total arrival of 1.2 million people.[54] In **Libya**, UNHCR planning figures project a total of 149 000 arrivals, almost double previous estimates.[55] Additionally, it is anticipated that 169 000 people will arrive in **Ethiopia**, an increase from over 60 000 in mid-September, and 40 000 will arrive in the **Central African Republic** – up from 35 000 in mid-September – by the end of 2024.

In addition to the high humanitarian needs among arrivals from the Sudan, the influx is expected to further exacerbate already severe pressure on resources, disrupt existing trade and supply chains, drive inflation, and increase costs of humanitarian response. This will create additional hardships for the already vulnerable host communities. As a result, in addition to displaced people in need of humanitarian assistance, over 556 000 people from host communities in the Sudan's neighbouring countries are projected to be in need of humanitarian assistance, according to UNHCR, by the end of the year.

The crisis in the Sudan is having significant repercussions on neighbouring economies. In South Sudan in particular, substantial oil revenue losses resulting from a pipeline break in the Sudan, are exacerbating inflation, widening the fiscal gap, and accelerating currency depreciation against the US dollar.[56] Despite, the likely resumption of oil exports,[57] economic challenges are expected to persist during the outlook period.[58]

Number of people in acute food insecurity in hunger hotspots

in 2024 and 2025 (where available, most recent data[1]), in millions



Source of data: FAO and WFP. 2024. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (November 2024 to April 2025)*. Rome.

[1] The data presented are the most recent projection. Data are from 2024 and 2025 except for Ethiopia and the Syrian Arab Republic (both 2023).
[2] Population coverage is 87 percent.
[3] Most recent data reported are non-peak. Peak numbers are presented in the graph on page 11.
[4] No severity disaggregation is available. This estimate corresponds to the upper-bound of a range.
[5] HNO 2024. Data are from 2023. Refers to the number of people in need of food security and livelihood assistance. No severity disaggregation is available. Acute food insecurity figures are based on a combination of Household Economy Analysis, Displacement Tracking Matrix and Village Assessment Survey.
[6] IPC-equivalent. Based on the Addendum to the Myanmar HNRP 2024.
[7] Based on WFP CARI. Data are from 2023. Refers to the number of people in need of food security and livelihood assistance. This includes 1 million people severely acute food insecure based on WFP's CARI methodology, and 2.1 million IDPs in camps, who are fully dependent on assistance.
[8] No severity disaggregation is available. This estimate corresponds to the upper bound of a range.
[9] Population coverage is 88 percent.
[10] Population coverage is 92 percent excluding N'Djamena, it also includes refugees and returnees calculated from an additional CH analysis.
[11] Population coverage is 30 percent.
[12] Most recent data are non-peak. Peak numbers are presented in the graph on page 11.
[13] Population coverage is 32 percent, and includes arid and semi-arid lands. Most current data are non-peak.
[14] The 2024 data does not account for the escalation of conflict in late September. An IPC analysis is planned for updating the situation.
[15] A projection for April–June 2025 is also available. The October 2024–March 2025 projection is presented in this graph for better alignment with the time period covered in other southern African countries.
[16] Population coverage is 68 percent.
[17] Populations that are classified as moderately acute food insecure and severely acute food insecure as per WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).
[18] Prevalence of the population analysed expressed in percentage terms.

The IPC technical manual provides guidance on where each indicator sits within the IPC analytical framework. For details see: https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc/technical/manual_en.

Reduction of humanitarian assistance

Based on funding received as of August, 2024 marks the second consecutive year of declining humanitarian funding, following the surge in global humanitarian needs and the subsequent scale-up in humanitarian assistance in 2021 and 2022. The 2024 Global Humanitarian Overview (GHO) currently calls for USD 49 billion. Reported GHO funding reached USD 14.5 billion – or 29 percent – in August 2024. This was USD 1.36 billion or 8 percent less compared to the same time last year.[59]

The food security sector requires USD 16.4 billion through 43 coordinated plans in 2024,[a, 60] compared to USD 20.9 billion in 2023.[61] Twelve humanitarian response plans and flash appeals are currently facing funding gaps of more than 75 percent for food security. Among these, seven are identified as hunger hotspots, including three countries of very high concern: Yemen, the Syrian Arab Republic and Myanmar.

While countries with populations classified in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) remain of highest concern, urgent food and emergency agricultural assistance is required in all hunger hotspots to support households facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above). Decision-makers should not wait for further deterioration of food insecurity before scaling up assistance to these populations. Early investment and action not only save lives; they also save financial resources, as anticipatory action has been shown to be more cost-effective than emergency responses.

a Data can vary from data reported by the gFSC which required USD 14.9 billion to assist 122 million people across 29 countries with an active food security cluster/sector as of June 2024.

Highest concern: Hotspots with catastrophic conditions

This category includes:

- countries or territories with Famine or Risk of Famine;
- countries or territories with populations already in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5); and
- countries or territories at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions, i.e. where an extremely vulnerable population in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is facing severely worsening contextual drivers and access constraints, which indicate the possibility of a further deterioration and possible occurrence of catastrophic conditions in the outlook period.

In the **Sudan**, Famine levels of acute food insecurity reported in July in Zamzam camp for internally displaced persons (IDP) in North Darfur, which hosts several hundred thousand displaced people, are highly likely to persist beyond October 2024. Famine conditions could be present in other areas with high concentrations of IDPs and refugees.[62] Many other areas throughout the Sudan will likely remain at risk of Famine beyond October,[63] and levels of acute food insecurity may expand, driven by escalating conflict, a deepening economic crisis and extreme humanitarian access constraints. The intensification of conflict into new areas, including southeastern key-producing zones, will further drive internal and cross-border displacements. This will add to the 11.3 million people who were forcibly displaced between April 2023 and the beginning of October 2024,[64] forcing more people to seek refuge in neighbouring countries. Between October 2024 and February 2025, around 21.1 million people are projected to experience Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, including 6.4 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) during the harvest. This represents a staggering increase compared to pre-conflict levels.[65]

In **Palestine**, as of the beginning of October 2024, the risk of Famine persisted across the whole Gaza Strip. Given a recent surge in hostilities, there are growing concerns that this worst-case scenario may materialize, while the population classified in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is expected to nearly triple from November. Between November 2024 and April 2025, 876 000 people (41 percent of the analysed population) are projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity, and nearly 345 000 people (16 percent of the analysed population) will likely experience catastrophic food insecurity (IPC Phase 5).[66] Conflict will continue to result in loss of human lives, and to drive displacement and the destruction of livelihoods and food systems, while essential goods are severely restricted and humanitarian access extremely constrained.[67] Approximately 1.9 million people (90 percent of the Gaza population) were displaced as of mid-October, while Gaza's economy had contracted to less than one-sixth of its 2022 level by mid-2024.[68, 69, 70] Concerns are also rising on the situation in the West Bank, where increasing violence, poverty, unemployment, forced displacement, movement restrictions and economic decline persist.

In **South Sudan**, the number of people facing starvation and death was projected to nearly double between April and July 2024 compared to the same period in 2023. The critical food security situation is expected to worsen as the 2025 lean season approaches, typically starting in May. The arrival of returnees, refugees, and asylum seekers from the Sudan into bordering states is expected to spike with the end of the rainy season and escalating conflict in the Sudan,[71] further increasing pressure on host communities.[72] Moreover, flooding is causing displacement and damage.[73] High food prices, severe economic challenges, conflict and insecurity are also key drivers of acute food insecurity. Between April and July 2024, 2.3 million people were projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 79 000 people were projected to face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) acute food insecurity, particularly in Pibor and Aweil East counties and among returnees from the Sudan.[74]

In **Haiti**, already critical levels of acute food insecurity are likely to worsen, with emerging pockets of Catastrophic conditions among displaced populations. Expanding violence by armed groups, particularly outside the capital, is expected to lead to increased displacement not only within the Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince but also across the rest of the country, especially in Great South departments.[75] The ongoing economic crisis, combined with a likely below-average cereal output and above-normal hurricane season, is expected to exacerbate food insecurity in a context where the prevalence of acute food insecurity is already among the highest globally. Between August 2024 and February 2025, 2 million people (18 percent of the analysed population) are projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity, with 6 000 people were facing Catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5).[76] During the period from March to June 2025, nearly 2 million people (17 percent of the analysed population) are projected to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity, including nearly 6 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5).[77]

In **Mali**, critical levels of acute food insecurity are likely to worsen, with some populations in the north facing Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) levels, driven by conflict and very high access constraints. Following the full withdrawal of UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in late 2023, conflict has escalated, with a marked rise in fatalities.[78, 79] Ongoing blockades by NSAGs and constraints to humanitarian operations will continue to impact food security. As per the latest available analysis, 2 500 people in Ménaka were projected to face Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in June–August 2024, while 121 000 people were projected to face Emergency (CH Phase 4) across Mopti, Gao, Tombouctou and Kidal.[80]

Very high concern: Hotspots with deteriorating critical conditions

Several other hunger hotspots need urgent action to avert extreme hunger or death. These are countries/territories/regional clusters where:

- sizeable populations – over 500 000 people or more than 10 percent of the analysed population (when at least 50 percent of the population has been analysed) – are estimated or projected to be facing Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 4) or are identified as severely acute food insecure as per WFP's CARI methodology;
- the number of people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or severe acute food insecurity (based on WFP's CARI methodology) is expected to increase during the outlook period as based on latest data available; and
- contextual drivers are likely to further deteriorate.

Chad, Lebanon, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen are hotspots of very high concern.

In **Chad**, acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate due to the persistent influx of people fleeing the Sudan, high food prices and persistent conflict and insecurity. Furthermore, severe floods during the 2024 rainy season have aggravated food insecurity conditions across the country. Between June and August 2024, 534 000 Chadians residents and over 122 000 Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees were facing Emergency (CH Phase 4) levels of acute food insecurity.

Acute food insecurity is likely to worsen significantly in **Lebanon**, due to the intensified conflict and economic deterioration. As of the end of September, around 1 million people have been displaced, mainly from the south of the country and Beirut's southern suburbs due to the intense conflict escalation,[81] surpassing levels reached during the 2006 war. The number of people facing Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 4) is expected to rise significantly over the forecast period.

In **Mozambique**, acute food insecurity is likely to worsen due to persisting conflict in Cabo Delgado province and climate events. The expected La Niña event in 2024/25 enhances the probability of more frequent tropical storms and cyclones from November to April, resulting in flooding and likely agricultural losses across the country.[82] An estimated 773 000 people (8 percent of the analysed population) are projected to face Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 4) from October 2024 to March 2025, which represents a significant deterioration compared to the same period last year.[83]

In **Myanmar**, acute food insecurity may further deteriorate in the outlook period, due to persisting high-intensity conflict and a deepening economic crisis. According to the latest projection, 2.7 million people were projected to face Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 4) between June and August 2024.[84] The recent conflict intensification, spike in the food and fuel prices, and severe flooding could drive up these numbers.[85]

Acute food insecurity in **Nigeria** is likely to deteriorate due to the poor macroeconomic situation, elevated inflation and insecurity. Rising banditry and intercommunal tensions are expected in north-west and north-central states,[86] while humanitarian access has deteriorated in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states.[87] Moreover, prospects for the 2024 main cereal harvest have been curbed by high input prices, low household purchasing power[88] and adverse weather, including severe flooding. Nearly 1 million people were estimated to face Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 4)[89] during the June to August 2024 lean season.

In the **Syrian Arab Republic**, already high levels of acute food insecurity are expected to deteriorate due to economic decline, high food prices and the risks of escalation of conflict and tensions in several regions, compounded by the escalation of hostilities in Lebanon which is driving a surge of returnees in adverse conditions, and resulting in major economic repercussions. According to the 2024 HNO issued in December 2023, 12.9 million people are experiencing acute food insecurity based on WFP's CARI methodology.[90, 91, 92]

Severe acute food insecurity is expected to persist in **Yemen**, due to economic crisis, localized conflict, insuffìcent humanitarian assistance, and floods in crop producing areas. The weak economic conditions coupled with above-average food prices are limiting households' income-earning opportunities. In areas controlled by the Government of Yemen, 1.1 million people (11 percent of the analysed population) are projected to experience Emergency levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 4). Moreover, 20 districts classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) have at least 15 percent of their population in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), indicating a high risk of worsening to Emergency should there be any additional shocks.[b, 93] As of the cutoff date of this report, no recent IPC data was available for Sana'a based authorities (SBA)-controlled areas.

b The population figure referenced is intended for humanitarian purposes and is currently under review. It has not yet received full approval from the government.

Other countries or situations that require monitoring

Several other countries or situations, while not identified as hunger hotspots in this report, merit close monitoring. These include:

- countries or situations where data was insufficient or not available to allow for a comparative assessment based on the applied methodology, but which were flagged as concerning during the discussions based on other evidence, as described below; and
- countries or situations in protracted crisis with high numbers and/or high prevalence of people in acute food insecurity, but without clear evidence for a likely food security deterioration of a level comparable with trends observed in countries selected as hunger hotspots.

Such situations of concern include, but are not limited to, the following countries:

In **Afghanistan**, high levels of acute food insecurity are expected to persist despite some recent improvements. Falling incomes[94] will continue to limit access to food despite low staple prices, and food needs will remain high due to the influx of Afghan returnees from Pakistan.[95] La Niña conditions could lead to below-average rainfall, impacting crop production and food security in late 2025. Lack of funding is also constraining emergency food assistance,[96] which is reaching only 1 million of the 12 million people in need.[97] From May to October 2024, around 12.4 million people were estimated to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), with 2.4 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), compared to 15.3 million people a year earlier.[98]

Food insecurity among **Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh** remains severe, with 582 000 people (60 percent of the analysed population) facing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 191 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) between April and October 2024.[99] Conflict in Myanmar is likely to drive more refugees into overcrowded camps already vulnerable to extreme weather and security risks.[100, 101] Bangladesh's fragile economy, with 14.1 food inflation in July,[102] adds further strain. In Cox's Bazar, vulnerable populations are facing loss of land, resource competitions and security issues, all worsened by the impact of Cyclone Remal in May.

The food security situation in **Central America** (**Guatemala,**[103] **Honduras,**[104] **El Salvador and Nicaragua**) remains of concern. A delayed *primera* planting due to a late rainy season and localized torrential precipitations[105] has extended the lean season into September, potentially affecting food availability and raising prices. Food insecurity in the region's Dry Corridor, northern Honduras, and in Guatemala's Altiplano and in Alta Verapaz is expected to remain high until the *primera* harvest.[106] An above-average Atlantic hurricane season[107] and La Niña-related above-average rains into early 2025[108] could cause flash floods, crop damage and pest infestations – particularly beans that are highly vulnerable to waterlogging and disease – impacting food access and likely increasing acute food insecurity over the outlook period.

Despite a lack of recent data, the acute food security situation in **Angola** is of concern. In southern and eastern provinces affected by an El Niño-induced drought, low food stocks and reduced agricultural labour opportunities have significantly decreased purchasing power amid exceptionally poor harvests, causing households to resort to unsustainable coping strategies or face food consumption gaps.[109] Inflation has been rising steadily, reaching 31.1 percent in July 2024[110] with atypically high agricultural input prices reported ahead of the crop production season beginning in September 2024.[111] Vulnerable households will be especially at risk during the lean season starting in January.

Acute food insecurity in the **Democratic Republic of the Congo** remains of concern due to continued armed conflict, which displaced more than 1.4 million between January and July 2024,[112] alongside high food prices.[113] A potential reduction of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission (MONUSCO) presence in the outlook could increase humanitarian needs and access challenges. From January to June 2024, 23.4 million people were projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 2.9 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[114]

Food insecurity in **Madagascar** is at risk of deterioration, due to high food prices[115] and above-average rainfall from September to December 2024, along with above-average temperatures linked to La Niña,[116] which could increase the risk of flooding[117] and locust outbreaks.[118] The expectation of a more intense cyclone season could further exacerbate agricultural losses,[119] affecting nearly 1.8 million people (17 percent of the analysed population) projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) from January to April 2025 in the Grand Sud, Grand Sud-Est, East and North regions.[120]

Acute food insecurity remains of high concern in the **Central African Republic**, driven by fuel shortages,[121] ongoing conflict, and high levels of internal displacement, which stood at 453 000 people as of June 2024.[122] Access constraints, particularly in the northwest,[123, 124] and increasing needs stemming from the influx of Sudanese refugees further exacerbate the situation.[125] Additionally, above-normal rainfall is expected between September and November 2024,[126] increasing flood risks that could affect cereal production. Around 2.5 million people, or 41 percent of the population, faced high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) between April and August 2024, including 508 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[127]

In **Sierra Leone**, 1.6 million people (20 percent of the population) were estimated to be acutely food insecure and in need of urgent assistance (CH Phase 3 or above) between June and August 2024, including over 31 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4), with high food prices and macroeconomic factors being the main drivers of food insecurity.[128] Inflation has eased in recent months,[129] but food prices remain elevated, constraining food access for the most vulnerable, who also face a stagnation in minimum wage rates.[130] Flooding in September caused some damage to infrastructure, in addition to rainfall deficits at the start of the rainy season, may result in localized production shortfalls.

Acute food insecurity trends in hunger hotspots of highest and very high concern

2020–2025[1] peak numbers and prevalence

NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN IPC/CH 3+ OR EQUIVALENT (IN MILLIONS)[2]

PREVALENCE IPC/CH 3+ OR EQUIVALENT[3]

Hotspots of highest concern



Hotspots of very high concern





Source of data: FAO and WFP. 2024. *Hunger Hotspots analysis (November 2024 to May 2025)*. Rome.

1 Data for 2024 and 2025 are considered as expected peak based on information available as of September 2024. For the Syrian Arab Republic, no peak data are available for the expected peak period in 2024 and 2025.

2 Populations that are classified as moderately acute food insecure and severely acute food insecure as per WFP's CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above).

3 Prevalence of the population analysed expressed in percentage terms.

4 Data for 2023 and 2024 come from IPC analyses. Data for 2022 are from HNOs while data from 2020–2021 are based on the Socioeconomic and Food Security Survey methodology with acute food insecurity prevalence referring to households as opposed to individuals. These sources apply different methodologies which limits comparability. The 2020 and 2021 figures refer to the same analysis (2020 Socioeconomic and Food Security Survey published in 2021); therefore, the 2020 estimate does not align with the source used in the 2020 Global Report on Food Crises.

5 Although a projection covering up to February 2025 is available, it covers the harvest period and may not reflect the peak in needs amid escalating conflict.

6 The 2024 figure includes refugees and returnees calculated from an additional CH analysis.

7 Includes Lebanese, Syrian refugees, Palestine Refugees in Lebanon and Palestine Refugees from the Syrian Arab Republic. The 2024 data do not account for the escalation of conflict in late September. An IPC analysis is planned for updating the situation.

8 Significant change over time in the population analysed, comparability is limited. Data for 2024 and 2025 come from the same analysis.

9 Data for 2023 come from pre-analysis conducted under the HNRP, as a basis for generating results for the 2024 projection used by the Myanmar HNRP 2024, and are IPC equivalent. Data for 2024 are based on the Addendum to the Myanmar HNRP 2024 published in June 2024 and are IPC equivalent.

10 Geographical coverage increased from 16 states and Federal Capital Territory in 2020 to 26 states and Federal Capital Territory in 2024; therefore, comparability is limited.

11 Based on WFP CARI. No peak data are yet available for 2024.

12 Data for 2020–2022 come from IPC; data for 2023–2025 come from FEWS NET, and the figures for 2024–2025 correspond to the upper bound of a range.

Comparison over time indicates a general trend; however, comparability issues exist due to the following factors:

(i) Differences in coverage for specific countries: Haiti: larger coverage of urban areas in 2020, while the population analysed was 87–93 percent of the total country population in 2020–2023, it was 100 percent in 2024 and 2025; Sudan: increase in total population estimates between 2020 and 2023; Chad: increase from 90 percent coverage in 2020 to 100 percent in 2023, and 91 percent in 2024; Lebanon: the population analysed increased from 92 percent of the total country population in 2022–2023 to 100 percent in 2024; Mozambique: increase from 60 percent coverage in 2020 and 2021 to 100 percent in 2022, back to 49 percent in 2023, and 30 percent in 2024–2025; Nigeria: increase from 49 percent in 2020 to 91 percent in 2023, and 87 percent in 2024.

(ii) Variation in analysis time periods differ for Haiti, Palestine and Yemen.

Caution in reading and using this analysis should be observed. Trends of prevalence and total numbers can diverge due to changes in population covered.

Country risk narratives

Asia and the Pacific

Myanmar

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, economic deterioration, flooding

Acute food insecurity may further deteriorate during the outlook period due to ongoing high-intensity conflict, a deepening economic crisis and the impact of flooding.

Conflict between the military and NSAGs is expected to intensify in border states, raising protection concerns and leading to new waves of displacement, particularly of Rohingya.[131, 132] The conflict severely limited humanitarian access, funding,[c, 133] and exacerbated vulnerabilities.[134, 135] Since June 2024, escalating fighting in Rakhine, Shan, Kachin and Mandalay states has resulted in increased displacements,[136] bringing the total to 3.4 million people displaced since the military takeover in February 2021.[137]

Myanmar's economy is anticipated to struggle with minimal growth, projected at only 2 percent in 2025 according to the IMF,[138] due to escalating violence and a depreciating currency. As of August 2024, the basic food basket has seen a year-on-year increase of 57 percent. Rice prices have risen by 47 percent compared to the previous year, driven by increased production costs, limited access to markets and agricultural inputs, currency depreciation, and rising fuel prices.[139] Recent economic measures aimed at increasing the monetary base and introducing controls on financial flows are likely to further exacerbate inflation and deter foreign investment.[140] Capital flight is expected to continue, further weakening the local currency and undermining efforts to stabilize the economy.[141]

According to the latest available outlook, 13.3 million people (24 percent of the population) are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (equivalent to IPC Phase 3 or above), including 2.7 million people in Emergency (equivalent to IPC Phase 4) between June and August 2024.[142] These estimates do not consider the impact of severe flooding in central and southeastern parts of the country in September 2024.[143] Furthermore, proxy indicators such as dietary diversity suggest a deteriorating nutrition situation, coinciding with the widening conflict and severe access challenges impacting life-saving nutrition programmes in Rakhine, as well as the Northeast, Northwest and Southeast regions.[144]

RECOMMENDATIONS
Emergency response

Urgent action required. Seek donor funding to address the critical shortfall in the 2024 HNRP, which is currently at only 28 percent of the USD 994 million appeal. Immediate resources are essential as conflict-driven displacement, severe flooding in September and the impending cyclone season intensify the urgency of the situation.

- Sustain and scale up emergency food and nutrition assistance for displaced populations and host communities, leveraging partnerships to reach hard-to-access areas.
- Supply vegetable kits, poultry feed, rice seeds and fertilizers to vulnerable displaced and host communities in affected states.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Other actions

- Review and enhance preparedness in coastal areas for the upcoming Bay of Bengal cyclone season and potential large-scale displacements.
- Monitor the ongoing flow of commercial trade into Myanmar, which provides a lifeline for the population.
- Strengthen advocacy with donors, humanitarian actors and governments to ensure access for delivering and monitoring emergency aid. Expand and diversify delivery methods while adhering to principled guidelines.

c Eight months into the year, the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP) remains critically underfunded, with only 21.1 per cent of required funding received.

East Africa

South Sudan

Key drivers of food insecurity: severe economic crisis, floods, cross-border movements, intercommunal violence

Acute food insecurity, already at catastrophic levels in several areas, is likely to worsen as the 2025 lean season approaches, typically starting in May. This deterioration is driven by high food prices, a severe economic crisis, conflict and insecurity, cross-border movements from the Sudan, and flooding.[145]

The dire economic situation has been exacerbated by significant oil revenue losses resulting from a pipeline break in the Sudan, worsening inflation, widening the fiscal gap, and accelerating currency depreciation against the US dollar.[146] Despite, the likely resumption of oil exports,[147] economic challenges are expected to persist during the outlook period. In June 2024, national average prices for maize and sorghum were 60 to 90 percent higher than the previous year and nearly 200 percent higher than in July 2015, prior to the currency collapse.[148] Although increased stocks from local harvests are expected to reduce sorghum and maize prices between October 2024 and January 2025, downward pressure on prices is likely to be short lived and minimal.[149] Prices are projected to rise further during the lean season beginning in May.[150]

By mid-October 2024, over 1 million people had been affected by severe flooding, primarily in Unity, Jonglei, Warrap and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states.[151] The flooding has caused displacement, damaged crops, property and infrastructure, and increased the risk of disease outbreaks. Severe flooding is anticipated to continue due to heavy rainfall and record water levels in Lake Victoria flowing into the Nile River,[152] with an estimated 3.3 million people likely to be impacted.[153]

The combination of flooding and intercommunal conflict in these states will continue to restrict market access, livelihood opportunities and humanitarian access.[154] Additionally, as of August 2024, Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, Unity and Upper Nile states had received over 800 000 returnees, refugees and asylum seekers from the Sudan.[155] New arrivals are likely to spike with the end of the rainy season and with escalating conflict in Blue Nile and White Nile states bordering South Sudan,[156] further increasing pressure on host communities and raising humanitarian needs.

Approximately 7.1 million people (56 percent of the total population) were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) between April and July 2024. This includes 2.3 million people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and 79 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Compared to the same period in 2023, the number of people facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) has nearly doubled.[157]

Over 1.65 million children under 5 years of age and 870 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women were projected to be acutely malnourished by June 2024.[158] Acute malnutrition levels remain high, exceeding 20 percent in several areas of Upper Nile, Warrap, Jonglei and Unity states. However, recent screenings at the Sudanese border show a relatively stable proxy global acute malnutrition (GAM) rate below 10 percent. Nonetheless, malnutrition in transition centres continues to be a concern, driven by overcrowding and restricted movements.[159]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Support comprehensive surveillance systems that monitor both human and animal health for early detection of zoonotic pathogens. This effort should include training and capacity building for health and veterinary personnel to strengthen local capabilities in recognizing and responding to zoonotic diseases.
- Expand public messaging and outreach for community preparedness for floods, including identification of safe higher grounds for relocation of affected communities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2024 HRP calls for USD 588 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 210 million for nutrition interventions.

- Scale up unconditional food and cash transfers and emergency livelihood assistance to vulnerable populations, refugees, returnees and IDPs, particularly women and children, in areas where populations are in Emergency and Catastrophe (IPC Phases 4 and 5). Ensure life-saving general food assistance reaches the most flood-affected populations. This will require early funding allocations to ensure that resources can be pre-positioned during the dry season from December to April, and reduce the need for costly air transport.
- Increase nutrition assistance for women and children in areas with high malnutrition rates, reinforcing integration with water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), health and protection partners.
- Enhance local production of food in areas classified as Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) through the provision of livelihood kits adapted to agroecological zones (crops, vegetable, fishing kits).
- Improve livestock production and reduce mortality through vaccination and treatment.
- Protect livelihoods through social safety net support, including labour-intensive public works to improve access to markets, inputs, and water resources for agricultural activities by assisting vulnerable communities in building and maintaining rural roads, irrigation systems and water management infrastructure.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Other actions

- Continue advocating for and negotiating humanitarian access in conflict-affected areas. This should include unimpeded supply corridors for the movement of essential goods and personnel, allowing civilians to receive humanitarian assistance and services, and enabling aid agencies to operate freely and safely.

Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia

Key drivers of food insecurity: below-average rains, conflict, economic deterioration

An increased likelihood of below-average rainfall from October to December 2024,[160] linked to La Niña,[161] could exacerbate food insecurity across Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. This comes amid a slow recovery from the 2020–2023 drought,[162] followed record flooding in late 2023 and early 2024. Recent mixed agricultural performances, ongoing conflicts and insecurity, and macroeconomic challenges in Ethiopia, as well as reduced delivery of humanitarian assistance, are additional drivers of acute food insecurity.

Recent cropping seasons, including the *Long Rains* in Kenya, the *Meher* and *Belg* in Ethiopia and the *Gu* in Somalia, recorded mixed performances. While above-average rainfall created favourable conditions, flooding, delayed rains, dry spells, and conflict and insecurity in localized areas negatively impacted crop performance across parts of the region.[163, 164] The Greater Horn of Africa Climate Outlook Forum (GHACOF) indicates an increased likelihood of below-average rains between October and December across all of Somalia, eastern Kenya, and southern and southeastern Ethiopia,[165, 166] partly due to La Niña. Forecasts from global meteorological agencies also point to below-average rains.[167, 168, 169, 170]

Conflict and insecurity persist across parts of the region.[171] Somalia continues to face security force operations against NSAGs, alongside inter-clan fighting, with a 31 percent increase in violence-related fatalities from June to July 2024 compared to the same period in 2023.[172] In Ethiopia, conflicts continue in the Oromia and Amhara regions,[173] while Kenya has seen demonstrations[174] and violence related to NSAGs and pastoralist militias.[175] Displaced populations across Ethiopia and Somalia totalled 8.3 million people as of 30 September.[176] Humanitarian access remains severely restricted, with extreme access constraints in Somalia, very high access constraints in Ethiopia, and high access constraints in Kenya.[177] Funding gaps, further hamper assistance efforts,[178] in particular for Ethiopia, with only 21 percent of the requested funds for the HRP mobilized as of end September 2024.[179] Meanwhile, Ethiopia is experiencing high food prices up to 25 percent higher than last year's levels.[180, 181]

An estimated 1.7 million people in arid and semi-arid lands of Kenya are projected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) between October 2024 and January 2025,[182] compared to 1.5 million the same period one year before.[183, 184] In Somalia, an estimated 4.4 million people are expected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) between October and December 2024, including 982 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[185] In Ethiopia, according to the 2024 HRP published in February 2024, around 15.8 million people were facing high levels of acute food insecurity and were in need of assistance.[186] In Ethiopia, in spite of an improvement in food security expected at the national level during the last quarter of 2024 compared to the peak 2024 figures due to the *Meher* harvest, some areas will face a deterioration during the outlook period, including south and southeastern pastoral areas. Extreme climate events and conflict are also exacerbating the already high levels of malnutrition in the region. Over 6.2 million children are expected to be acutely malnourished, including 1.7 million severely malnourished children.[187]

RECOMMENDATIONS
Anticipatory actions

The Ethiopia HRP calls for USD 3.24 billion to assist 15.5 million people. The Somalia HNRP calls for USD 1.6 billion to assist 5.2 million people.

- Provide multipurpose cash transfers to vulnerable househols that aim to stabilize the purchasing power of targeted households to access food and address their essential needs ahead of the forecasted drought.
- Promote dissemination of early warning information and advisories to inform communities on drought risk management actions and protect their livelihoods, food security and nutrition.
- Support rangeland management activities to mitigate the forecasted impact of drought on livestock production and productivity.
- Provide transport subsidies to pastoralists to enable the movement of livestock out of the drought-affected areas.
- Strengthen animal health services, including surveillance, vaccination and voucher-based treatments.
- Livestock feed supplementation:
    - Promote the conservation of locally produced fodder and expand irrigated fodder production along perennial rivers.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Anticipatory actions

- Support private sector feed suppliers to source and transport concentrate livestock feed to remote and drought-prone areas.
- Establish and manage livestock feed camps, particularly for vulnerable and lactating livestock, to maintain heard health and productivity during periods of limited grazing.

- Promote irrigation-based agriculture for both crop and fodder production to bolster food security and income generation.
- Increase water access and availability via rainwater harvesting and storage systems and rehabilitating water points, including the prepositioning of collapsible water tanks.
- Develop alternative income opportunities, particularly for women who typically remain behind during drought-induced migration, to diversify income and enhance resilience.

Latin America and the Carribean

Haiti

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, economic deterioration, above-average hurricane season

The acute food insecurity situation in Haiti is likely to worsen, with pockets of displaced populations facing Catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5). This deterioration is driven by widespread violence perpetrated by armed groups, a protracted economic crisis, below-average cereal production in 2024, and the potential impact of flooding associated with the La Niña phenomenon and an above-normal hurricane season.

High levels of violence are likely to persist in the outlook, with armed groups expanding outside the capital, Port-au-Prince,[188] and amid a slow deployment of the UN-authorized Multinational Security Support Mission (MSSM) and increasing anti-gang operations. As of September 2024, the MSSM comprised over 400 police officers, with expectations to reach 2 500 members at full capacity.[189] Displacements, particularly in urban centres, is anticipated to rise, adding to a record 702 900 IDPs in September 2024[190] – a sharp increase over the past year.

Haiti's economy has steadily contracted between 2019 and 2023, experiencing one of the largest contractions globally, with an additional 3 percent decline forecasted in 2024.[191] Food inflation rose in the first half of 2024, reaching 42 percent in July.[192] With insecurity likely to continue hindering physical access to food and impairing the functioning of key markets, food inflation is expected to rise further, pushing vulnerable households out of the market.

Cereal output is forecasted to be below-average in the key producing departments of Artibonite, Ouest and Centre in 2024. Above-average rains through December could disrupt the harvest but may also benefit second-season crops.[193] The high likelihood of an above-normal hurricane season[194] until November raises additional risks of crop losses and damage to infrastructure.

Nearly half of Haiti's population (5.4 million people – 48 percent of the analysed population) is projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between August 2024 and February 2025, including nearly 6 000 people in Catastrophic conditions (IPC Phase 5) among IDPs in the Metropolitan Area of Port-au-Prince. Approximately 2 million people (18 percent of the population) are in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[195] From March to June 2025, 5.5 million people are projected to face Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, also including nearly 6 000 people in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Additionally, around 277 000 children and 27 000 pregnant or breastfeeding women are projected to be acutely malnourished through November 2024 and in need of nutritional support.[196]

RECOMMENDATIONS
Anticipatory actions

- Support safe storage of essential items (documents, medicines, clean water) where appropriate.
- Preposition contingency food stocks across the country to provide initial food assistance to the 250 000 most vulnerable people.
- Continue mitigating the impacts of severe weather by building resilience in communities through tree planting and infrastructure rehabilitation to reduce erosion and flooding.
- Provide micro-insurance to approximately 9 000 small-scale farmers.
- Implement anticipatory cash assistance programmes targeting the most vulnerable in rural and urban areas to mitigate the anticipated impacts of potential hurricanes and floods.
- Preposition fishing equipment and materials for fishers likely to be affected by hurricanes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2024 HRP calls for USD 340 million for food security and USD 32.5 million for nutrition interventions.

- Ensure that emergency humanitarian assistance reaches people facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, including IDPs and host communities, to increase food availability and access for affected populations, with particular emphasis on women, children and other vulnerable groups.
- Scale up efforts to prevent and treat acute malnutrition in areas showing increasing prevalence of malnutrition, emphasizing integration with food security, WASH and health partners.
- Safeguard livestock assets and revive production by providing goats, roosters, hens, materials for constructing chicken coops, and treatment and vaccination for livestock.
- Improve staple food and vegetable production by distributing crop and vegetable seeds and providing training on good agricultural practices.
- Implement multipurpose cash transfer programmes to facilitate the purchase of food and agricultural inputs, targeting families severely affected by inflation, restricted market access and conflict.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Other actions

- Expand school meal activities, including the promotion of local food procurement from smallholder farmers to enhance resilient livelihoods and improve local economies.
- Strengthen coordination mechanisms among government agencies, non-governmental organizations and international organizations to ensure a more effective and cohesive response to the crisis. This includes regular information sharing and joint planning efforts.

Near East and North Africa

Sudan

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, economic collapse, impact of floods

Famine levels of acute food insecurity have been reported in July 2024 in Zamzam IDP camp in North Darfur, which hosts several hundred thousand displaced people, and these conditions are highly likely to persist beyond October 2024. Famine conditions could be present in other areas with high concentrations of IDPs and refugees. A high number of people is projected to face catastrophic levels of acute food insecurity through February 2025.[197] According to the IPC Famine Review Committee report,[198] acute food insecurity levels are likely to further deteriorate due to ongoing conflict and a deepening economic crisis, compounded by extreme access constraints and the potential for an earlier lean season.

In the outlook, the conflict is likely to expand further, affecting heavily populated states. The Rapid Support Forces have occupied strategic positions in Sennar state, increasing the likelihood of offensives into neighbouring Gedaref, White Nile and Blue Nile states, where large, displaced populations reside.[199] In North Darfur state, the battle for El Fasher town is expected to be prolonged. The number of IDPs registered since the outbreak of conflict in April 2023 is projected to increase, from the record high of 8.1 million people by the beginning of October. The total number of forcibly displaced people amounted to 11.3 million people.[200]

The economy is forecasted to contract by 4.2 percent in 2024, marking the seventh consecutive year of decline. Dwindling market supplies are driving up prices for both imported and local goods. In August 2024, the cost of the WFP local food basket increased by 19 percent compared to the previous month and nearly 200 percent since August 2023.[201, 202]

Concerns also remain regarding the performance of the 2024 cropping season. Despite generally favourable weather conditions, the conflict is spreading to key southeastern producing areas, particularly in Sennar, White Nile and Blue Nile states.[203] Additionally, heavy rainfall has triggered floods, resulting in significant destruction of homes and property, loss of life and crop losses.[204]

For the first time during the 2024 lean season, as of June, the IPC recorded catastrophic acute food insecurity in the Sudan. Famine (IPC Phase 5) was ongoing in July in Zamzam IDP camp in El Fasher, and is expected to persist at least up until October 2024. As of July, the IPC Famine Review Committee indicates that famine conditions are likely to continue beyond this date.[205] Other IDP camps in El Fasher area are also expected to experience similar conditions.[206] Many other areas throughout the Sudan will likely remain at risk of Famine beyond October. Currently a new IPC analysis is being developed.[207, 208]

Between October 2024 and February 2025, during the harvest season when acute food insecurity levels typically decline, nearly 21.1 million people (45 percent of the population) are projected to experience high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), including 6.4 million in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[209]

An estimated 109 000 people are projected in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) in conflict-affected areas.[210] After February 2025, as conflict expands, it is likely that the number of acutely food-insecure people will increase significantly, especially if concerns regarding the performance of the 2024 cropping season materialize. The already dire acute malnutrition situation is expected to deteriorate further in 2025. Most of the localities assessed in 2024 reported a global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence above the World Health Organization (WHO) emergency threshold of 15 percent, with prevalence exceeding the famine threshold of 30 percent in North Darfur's Al Lait, At Tawisha and Um Kadadah.[211]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2024 HNRP calls for USD 581 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 350 million for nutrition interventions.

- Provide emergency life-saving food assistance to populations facing Crisis and Emergency levels of acute food insecurity, including residents, newly displaced people, and protracted IDPs and refugees.
- Ensure the provision of malnutrition prevention actions, and treatment of moderate acute malnutrition, in areas with the highest levels of GAM and acute food insecurity.
- Deliver time-critical emergency life-saving and life-sustaining agriculture and livelihoods support to most vulnerable farmers, agropastoralists, pastoralists and fishers.
- Mobilize adequate funding resources to implement activities outlined in the Food Security and Livelihoods Sector Response Plan.
- Improve humanitarian access to ensure the provision of Food Security and Livelihoods Sector support to beneficiaries in critical need, especially in hard-to-reach areas.
- Establish targeted cash-assistance programmes for vulnerable farmers, to mitigate the impacts of instability and inflation in the Sudan.
- Develop and strengthen early-warning systems to monitor food-security risks, weather patterns and potential conflict zones, enabling rapid response.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Other actions

- Develop access to affordable agricultural credit and microfinance programmes that allow Sudanese farmers to invest in better inputs and practices.

Palestine

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, economic collapse

There are growing concerns that famine as a worst-case scenario may materialize in the Gaza Strip. As of the beginning of October 2024, according to latest IPC analysis, the whole of Gaza Strip faced the risk of Famine given a recent surge in hostilities. The population classified in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is expected to nearly triple from November.[212] Concerns are also growing regarding the impact of the security situation and movement restrictions in the West Bank.

Military operations in Gaza are expected to continue throughout the outlook period, leading to further displacement, loss of life and widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure.[213] By the end of October 2024, at least 42 718 Palestinians were killed in the Gaza Strip.[214]

As of September 2024, 66 percent of the total structures and a total of 227 591 estimated damaged housing units,[215] 68 percent of the cropland, and a considerable proportion of water, sanitation and health facilities had been damaged or destroyed.[216, 217] Approximately 1.9 million people (91 percent of the Gaza population) were displaced as of mid-October, while Gaza's economy had contracted to less than one-sixth of its 2022 level by mid-2024.[218, 219, 220]

Since the outbreak of conflict in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem have experienced escalating violence, internal movement restrictions, and a severe economic downturn. In the West Bank, over 700 Palestinians were killed between October 2023 and mid-October 2024.[221] Sustained mobility restrictions, including limited access to Israel, have resulted in widespread livelihood losses, with unemployment nearly tripling within 6 months.[222] This is compounded by a multidimensional fiscal crisis that was already impacting the Palestinian Authority before the conflict, causing delays and cuts in public salaries and undermining essential services.[223]

Humanitarian access remains extremely constrained amid a highly insecure operating environment.[224] Border crossing points into the Gaza Strip are inadequate, and humanitarian agencies face endless bureaucratic hurdles. This is resulting in large backlogs of relief assistance. Criminality along key supply routes has further complicated assistance delivery.

The population classified in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) is expected to nearly triple between November 2024 and April 2025, with the risk of Famine persisting as long as conflict continues and humanitarian access remains restricted. About 1.9 million people (91 percent of the analysed population) across the Gaza Strip will likely experience Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) including 876 000 people (41 percent of the analysed population) in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), and nearly 345 000 people (16 percent of the analysed population) who will likely experience catastrophic food insecurity (IPC Phase 5).[225]

Acute malnutrition is expected to worsen in all governorates.[226] In Rafah, the deterioration is expected to reach a critical level (IPC AMN Phase 4). Among children aged 6 to 59 months, an estimated 60 000 cases of acute malnutrition, of which 12 000 severe cases, are expected between September 2024 and August 2025.[227] Over 93 percent of young children and pregnant and breastfeeding women eating two or fewer food groups daily, and more than 90 percent of children under 5 years of age affected by multiple diseases.[228]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- Establish a secure humanitarian corridor for uninterrupted access to ensure delivery across the Gaza Strip.
- Sustain fuel and cooking-gas supply to support humanitarian efforts and keep vital services, such as mills and bakeries, operational in the Gaza Strip. These interventions will help rehabilitate the agriculture, livestock and fishing sectors to ensure sustained food production.
- Deliver essential agriculture inputs crucial to the production of nutritious and diversified food, animal survival and the re-initiating of agricultural, pastoral and fisheries production.
- Establish the operations of the remaining markets and bakeries, promoting access for the delivery of humanitarian and commercial goods. Where feasible, combine this with cash-based interventions to enhance cash liquidity and facilitate cash transfers.
- Provide livestock owners with veterinary support, animal feed and shelter materials to protect livestock.
- Set up community-based agricultural inputs and fodder storage systems to create reserves.
- Provide alternative training for fishers who face restrictions in accessing the sea, such as aquaculture or onshore fish farming.
- Provide acute malnutrition prevention services and treatment by expanding the coverage of blanket supplementary feeding programme and infant and young child feeding programmes.

Lebanon

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, protracted economic deterioration

Acute food insecurity is highly likely to worsen due to the unfolding military ground operation in southern Lebanon and airstrikes across the southern and central regions and suburbs of Beirut. The conflict is destroying essential infrastructure and causing widespread displacement, while compounding the long-standing impact of a protracted economic crisis and reduced humanitarian assistance.

As of the end of October 2024, 830 000 individuals were displaced due to conflict in the south, and this number is expected to continue rising.[229] The intensification of hostilities will substantially increase the number of people in need of humanitarian support. National authorities estimate that over 1 million people are now directly affected and/or displaced by the conflict.[230] A further escalation of the conflict would have dire consequences for both humanitarian needs and food security.

Lebanon's economy has been impacted severely by a protracted financial crisis since 2019. The annual inflation rate stood at around 32 percent in September 2024,[231] a marked decline from previous levels due to the widespread adoption of US dollar pricing. However, the cost of the survival minimum expenditure basket in July 2024 was 15 percent higher in US dollar terms compared to the same period last year.[232, 233] The price of a standard Arabic bread loaf, a key staple food, increased by nearly 20 percent by the end of September 2024 due to the termination of a World Bank loan that previously subsidized wheat imports for bread production.[234] Households already affected by poverty and conflict, particularly in south and north Lebanon, are likely to be the most vulnerable to these price increases.[235] Additionally, the ongoing hostilities are likely to disincentivize tourism – a critical source of foreign earnings – further undermining the country's economic outlook.[236]

The agriculture sector, which accounts for around 80 percent of southern Lebanon's GDP, is also expected to experience disruptions due to conflict. This will adversely impact the livelihoods of farmers and restrict land access due to safety concerns, particularly affecting the 70 percent of families in the southern regions who depend on agriculture.[237]

Overall, acute food insecurity levels are expected to rise further. From April to September 2024, nearly 1.3 million people in Lebanon (23 percent of the population) were projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), including Lebanese residents, and Syrian and Palestinian refugees. Among them, 85 000 people faced Emergency (IPC Phase 4) conditions, primarily in Akkar, Baalbek, Tripoli, Saida, Zahle and el Minieh-Dennie.[238]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

- Expand the capacity for the provision of ready-to-eat parcels, hot meals, food rations, bakeries and cash assistance for recently displaced people along primary routes and in areas of high internal displacement.
- Expand cash and, where necessary, in-kind support for communities and households hosting IDPs.
- Leverage existing national social protection systems for the horizontal (and potentially vertical) expansion of shock-responsive safety nets, to reach vulnerable Lebanese households with emergency cash assistance.
- Scale up existing cash assistance programmes for vulnerable Syrian refugees, with both horizontal and vertical expansion of emergency cash assistance.
- Shift from restricted to unrestricted cash assistance modalities, where possible, to provide affected populations with the flexibility to cover immediate needs and prevent overstressing existing retail networks.
- Establish agile and inter-operable beneficiary data-management platforms to ensure the effective use of resources, leveraging existing structures for humanitarian assistance (e.g. national protection systems, UNHCR assistance setup).
- Activate the cluster coordination system to improve coordination and minimize duplication of efforts among stakeholders.
- Provide unconditional cash assistance or vouchers for conflict-affected farmers and rural households (including IDPs with access to land and rural households who remain in affected regions) to address their immediate needs and enable continued food production, ensuring their ability to cope with the conflict's impacts on income and food security.
- Provide cash and voucher assistance to access essential agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizers, animal feed and veterinary supplies) to sustain livelihoods and maintain food production, particularly for the upcoming fall/winter planting season (November–December).
- Promote rainwater harvesting and other water-conservation techniques to improve water availability for irrigation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Other actions

- Offer microfinance options or loans tailored to Lebanese farmers and small agricultural enterprises to support investment in production and distribution, especially under the current challenging economic conditions.

Syrian Arab Republic

Key drivers of food insecurity: economic deterioration, conflict

Already high levels of acute food insecurity are expected to increase further due to economic deterioration, coupled with escalating conflict in several areas of the country. The ongoing escalation of conflict in Lebanon will drive increasing displacement, violence and economic deterioration into the Syrian Arab Republic.

Rainfall was sufficient across most governorates during the 2023/24 agricultural season,[239] despite uneven temporal distribution.[240] However, high temperatures in May, and limited accessibility to agricultural inputs, decreased yields. Wheat production for the 2024 harvest, concluded in August, is estimated to be near the five-year average.[241]

Despite relative economic stability after the severe crisis of 2023, macroeconomic headwinds in the form of energy supply scarcity, stagnant wages, ongoing inflation and currency devaluation, will continue to constrain access to food. In August 2024, the food component of the minimum expenditure basket was 43 percent higher year-on-year, while the monthly minimum wage covered only 16 percent of this cost.[242] A weakened Syrian pound remains a significant challenge for the country as a net food importer.[243]

The Syrian Arab Republic's economic deterioration comes on top of the ongoing risk of conflict escalation in several areas – particularly across northern and eastern regions of the country, notably around Idlib and Deir ez-Zour, as well as the areas near the Badia in the central and southern parts of the country, which could drive new displacements.[244, 245] Spillovers from the ongoing conflict in Lebanon are likely to further worsen the economic deterioration and lead to increased inflows of refugees in adverse conditions.[246]

The discontinuation of WFP's general food assistance since January 2024 continues to pose a major threat to food security. Funding shortfalls forced extreme prioritization measures. Between 2023 and 2024, WFP reduced its food assistance caseload by 80 percent, serving only one third of the number of severely acute food insecure people in the Syrian Arab Republic. Efforts to restart distributions to a reduced caseload are ongoing but are likely to meet only a fraction of the needs reported in the Syrian Arab Republic 2024 HRP.[247] There is an urgent need for emergency agricultural assistance that will persist at least until the end of the next winter agricultural season in late May 2025.

According to the 2024 HNO issued in December 2023, 15.4 million people (65 percent of the population) require food assistance and/or livelihood support in 2024. Of these, 12.9 million people are experiencing acute food insecurity based on WFP's CARI methodology and 2.6 million are at risk of acute food insecurity.[248]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2024 HRP calls for USD 1.2 billion for food security and livelihoods and USD 47 million for nutrition interventions.

- Maintain and expand investments in improving access to bread and strengthening the bread value chain in the Syrian Arab Republic. This includes rehabilitating bakeries, fortifying wheat flour, and ensuring the sustainability of bread production to enhance food security.
- Continue advocating for unrestricted access to food for the most vulnerable populations, ensuring that humanitarian assistance is not hindered by political or economic barriers.
- Support emergency interventions to assist farmers, through reliable agricultural production inputs (seeds, fertilizers, herbicides and agricultural kits), focusing on staple crops like wheat and barley, which are crucial to the Syrian Arab Republic's food security and dietary needs.
- Provide services to address livestock diseases and administer vaccines to improve animal health and prevent disease transmission across borders.
- Continue to rehabilitate agricultural infrastructure and productive assets while enhancing farmers' access to irrigation water, agricultural services and markets.
- Provide targeted support to women involved in agriculture, offering training, and access to credit and inputs to boost productivity.
- Enhance agricultural income diversity by supporting income-generating activities, providing functional training, adding value through food processing and packaging, and improving market access.
- Continue to provide in-kind and cash and voucher assistance, or a combination of approaches, based on feasibility assessments and market functionality.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Other actions

- Build the capacity of farmers and local technicians to adopt climate-smart agricultural practices that address climate change and the decline of natural resources.
- Support anticipatory actions by maintaining and enhancing monitoring and early-warning systems for natural hazards, conflicts and economic disruptions that could impact agriculture, food production and food security.
- Maintain capacities, adaptability and preparedness to respond effectively to current and future emergencies, leveraging context-specific opportunities and collaborative approaches to deliver impactful results.

Yemen

Key drivers of food insecurity: economic deterioration, below-average rainfall, impact of floods, localized conflict

Acute food insecurity is expected to remain high throughout the outlook period, driven by severe economic decline, localized conflict and recent flooding.

The ongoing competition between the Government of Yemen and Sana'a-based authorities (SBA) over control of the country's financial institutions has contributed to a 26 percent year-on-year depreciation of the Yemeni riyal in government-controlled areas as of July 2024.[249] This depreciation has led to record-high petrol and diesel prices and an all-time high cost of the minimum food basket in these areas.[250] Despite recent signs of de-escalation between the conflicting parties, the financial situation is expected to remain dire throughout the country. In the areas controlled by the Government of Yemen, the local currency is projected to further depreciate until early 2025.[251] Moreover, the economic deterioration may be exacerbated by a further intensification of regional conflict.

Humanitarian assistance remains insufficient and unpredictable. After a pause since December 2023, WFP resumed limited food assistance distributions in SBA-controlled areas in August 2024, with plans for further scale-up. In areas controlled by the Government of Yemen, assistance has continued,[252] albeit with delays due to funding shortfalls.[253] Attacks on the port of Al Hodeidah in late July have further disrupted imports and humanitarian assistance,[254] while large funding gaps persist, limiting overall assistance capacity.[255]

Moreover, forecasts indicate below-average rainfall for the upcoming season between October 2024 and February 2025.[256] This, combined with the damage caused by the July–September 2024 floods, will likely hinder agricultural production.[257] Recent surveys also indicate limited access to agricultural inputs and a reduction in the area planted, which is expected to negatively impact 2024 cereal production.[258]

Up to 19 million people (55 percent of the total population) are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity by March 2025, according to FEWS NET.[259] In areas controlled by the Government of Yemen, 4.6 million people (45 percent of the analysed population) are projected to experience Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity between October 2024 and February 2025. This includes 1.1 million people projected to experience Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In 20 districts classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3), at least 15 percent of their population are in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), indicating a high risk of worsening to Emergency should there be any additional shocks.[d, 260] Additionally, four districts in Taizz and Hodeidah were classified as being in Extremely Critical acute malnutrition (IPC AMN Phase 5) between July and October 2024. Nearly 610 000 children are projected to be acutely malnourished in the areas controlled by the Government of Yemen by the end of 2024 – a 34 percent increase from 2023.[261]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2024 HRP calls for USD 1.4 billion for food security and livelihoods, and USD 194 million for nutrition interventions.

- Expand general food assistance geographically and by household targeting, while maintaining the capacity to respond to emerging crises.
- Enhance crop production and strengthen climate resilience by providing agricultural inputs, including drought-resistant seeds, tools, fertilizers and crop varieties adapted to local climate challenges.
- Train farmers to improve agricultural practices to increase crop yields sustainably.
- Support nutrition through the distribution of vegetable seeds, water kits and agriculture tools for home gardening, coupled with awareness-raising training.
- Safeguard livestock assets by providing sheep, goats, animal feed and veterinary services, including vaccinations and treatments.
- Rebuild the livelihoods of fishers through the provision of fishing gear and equipment, and training on fish-preservation techniques, to reduce post-harvest losses and improve market access.
- Implement cash interventions for agricultural infrastructure projects and immediate food insecurity relief, to restore or strengthen agricultural livelihoods.
- Rehabilitate irrigation systems and improve water access for both agricultural and household use, by constructing water-harvesting structures to address shortages in rural areas.
- Support desert locust surveillance and control operations to protect crops and pasture lands from pest infestations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Other actions

- Advocate for and negotiate humanitarian access in coordination with other UN agencies, including the resumption of general food assistance in SBA-controlled areas.
- Establish a targeted food assistance programme, prioritizing the most vulnerable households amid limited resources.
- Continue donor advocacy for increased funding, to meet growing needs.
- Provide timely and accurate information on food security and nutrition, to guide interventions.

d The population figure referenced is intended for humanitarian purposes and is currently under review. It has not yet received full approval from the government.

Southern Africa

Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe

Key drivers of acute food insecurity: drought, floods, cyclones, economic shocks

The widespread and intense drought experienced earlier in 2024, and induced by El Niño, compounded by macroeconomic challenges, is driving a sharp rise in acute food insecurity across Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe during the outlook period. The prospects of above-average rainfall and enhanced cyclone activity linked to the La Niña phenomenon pose serious aggravating risks.

Significant rainfall deficits, coupled with heat waves, have drastically reduced maize production – the main food staple – in Southern Africa in 2024. Zambia, Zimbabwe and Lesotho have experienced production declines of 50–60 percent compared to the five-year average.[262] In Namibia, the aggregate 2024 cereal production is expected to fall by approximately 50 percent compared to the five-year average, while Malawi registered a lesser yet significant decline of 18 percent.[263] These production declines have increased import needs for 2024/25 and reduced regional exportable supplies, complicating countries' efforts to meet consumption needs – a situation worsened by weak currencies that inflate import costs.

Low domestic supplies are also exerting upward pressure on domestic food prices, with Zambia and Malawi facing currency devaluation,[264, 265] while Zimbabwe is already suffering from double-digit inflation.[266] Furthermore, rural farming households are experiencing liquidity constraints, which may lead to below-normal agricultural activity during the onset of the planting season in October 2024.[267]

The anticipated La Niña event, typically associated with above-average rainfall, will coincide with the region's agricultural season from October 2024 to March 2025. While this rainfall could support agricultural production, it also heightens the risk of flooding and crop losses. Tropical cyclones are likely to impact eastern parts of the region and inland countries such as Malawi and Zimbabwe,[268] while western areas, particularly Namibia, are likely to continue facing drier-than-normal conditions until February 2025. Weather-related damage and losses to crops and household assets are likely to exacerbate food insecurity. Additionally, funding gaps for assistance remain a significant concern.[269]

Across all five countries, acute food insecurity is expected to worsen significantly during the outlook period. According to FEWS NET analysis, Zimbabwe is projected to see an increase of 2.5 million people (a 15-percentage-point rise year-on-year) facing Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, reaching up to 6 million people by March 2025.[270] In Namibia, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) is projected to rise by 15 percentage points to 1.3 million (October 2024–March 2025).[271] In Malawi, 5.7 million people are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity (October 2024–March 2025), including 416 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[272] In Lesotho, the number of people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above) is projected to rise to 403 000 (October 2024–March 2025),[273] while in Zambia, 5.8 million people (33 percent of the analysed population) are projected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) between October 2024 and March 2025, including nearly 236 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).[274]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Disseminate early warnings and agricultural advisories, to ensure farmers and communities are aware of risks and appropriate risk-management options to minimize crop, livestock and other livelihood losses.
- Distribute hermetic bags and tools, to assist farmers in safely storing their harvest, and promote early harvesting of crops to facilitate rapid replanting using receding floodwaters.
- Deliver animal health interventions, including disease surveillance and vaccinations, to mitigate flood-induced disease outbreaks and parasites, and protect community fisheries resources and aquaculture assets, along with providing fishing kits.
- Provide unconditional cash, vouchers or cash+ (cash transfers plus seeds to support off-season production) alongside small-scale irrigation, water harvesting and soil conservation measures.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Emergency response

- Provide agricultural-input packages for crop and vegetable production, through in-kind distributions or e-vouchers, accompanied by training on sustainable and climate-smart agriculture.
- Implement unconditional in-kind food assistance, cash transfers or commodity vouchers, to facilitate access to food and restore the productive capacity of vulnerable households.
- Rehabilitate small-scale and community irrigation schemes, along with water points for irrigation and livestock.
- Implement water-harvesting measures to divert and safely store excess rainwater.
- Enhance livestock farmers' access to veterinary services, to prevent and control livestock losses due to drought-induced diseases.
- Offer training to livestock keepers on effective animal-feeding practices during drought and on measures for disease prevention and control.
- Expand supplemental nutritional support to prevent malnutrition among children and pregnant and breastfeeding women.
- Complement governments' national drought response through on-demand service provision and technical assistance in logistics, food procurement, cash-based transfer beneficiary management, and humanitarian needs assessment and coordination.
- Support smallholder farmers with post-harvest knowledge, skills, materials and equipment, to protect their produce from biological and environmental losses after harvest.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Other actions

- Assist governments in contingency and response planning, while providing timely and accurate information on food security and nutrition.
- Establish disaster risk financing mechanisms and implement both micro and macro-level drought and flood insurance for the upcoming agricultural season.

Mozambique

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, floods, tropical cyclone

The acute food insecurity situation is likely to worsen in the outlook period, due to ongoing conflict in Cabo Delgado province and severe weather events induced by La Niña, which are compounding agricultural losses.

The security situation in Cabo Delgado deteriorated in the first half of 2024, following the withdrawal of the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique. The escalation, characterized by an increase in, and greater geographic spread of, violence, displaced more than 160 000 people from January to July 2024 – reflecting a 140 percent increase compared to the same period last year.[275, 276] The rising violence has further impacted humanitarian access, led to temporary suspension of UN activities and heightened protection concerns for civilians.[277, 278] In the outlook, the probable expansion of contested areas into traditionally less-affected areas of the province is expected to exacerbate current access and displacement issues, resulting in further deterioration of acute food insecurity.

Additionally, the anticipated La Niña event for 2024/25 raises the likelihood of more frequent tropical storms, cyclones and flash floods from November to April, which will likely cause agricultural losses and negatively impact livelihoods across the country.[279, 280, 281, 282] Consequently, shortfalls in local food supply are expected, leading to temporary food-price spikes amid strong upward pressure on regional cereal market availability and prices, due to the impact of El Niño-induced drought on 2024 production.[283, 284]

An estimated 3.3 million people (33 percent of the analysed population) are projected to face Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) from October 2024 to March 2025.[285] Of particular concern are the 773 000 people in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), indicating a significant deterioration compared to the same period last year. The conflict-affected Cabo Delgado province hosts the largest population facing Crisis or worse levels of acute food insecurity, accounting for 31 percent of the total analysed population. Despite the generally low prevalence of GAM, over 144 000 children under 5 years of age, along with over 23 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women and girls, are expected to be acutely malnourished through March 2025.[286]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Anticipatory actions

- Disseminate early warnings and agricultural advisories, to ensure farmers and communities are aware of the risks and appropriate risk-management options to minimize crop, livestock and other livelihood losses.
- Distribute hermetic bags and tools to help farmers safely store their harvests, and promote early harvesting of crops where appropriate to enable rapid replanting using receding floodwaters.
- Deliver animal-health interventions to reduce the risk of flood-induced disease outbreaks and parasites, while also protecting community fisheries resources and aquaculture assets.
- Provide unconditional cash transfers, vouchers, cash+ (cash transfers plus seeds to support off-season production) combined with small-scale irrigation, water harvesting and soil conservation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The HRP calls for USD 172.6 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 15.6 million for nutrition interventions. Additionally, a drought appeal released in August 2024 for Mozambique calls for USD 199.3 million for food security and livelihoods.

- Distribute agricultural-input kits (seeds and tools) to help restore agricultural production, combined with training on climate-smart agriculture practices, targeting drought-affected areas.
- Implement surveillance and monitoring to prevent and control livestock-disease outbreaks, alongside vaccination campaigns targeting drought-related diseases.
- Promote income diversification for vulnerable communities, including the distribution of small livestock and fishing gear, while also supporting fodder production and conservation efforts.
- Ensure food needs are met while increasing the focus on resilience-building for IDPs, refugees and host communities, thereby promoting social cohesion and sustainable livelihoods to support long-term stability.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Other actions

- Strengthen the integration of humanitarian assistance with long-term development and peacebuilding efforts, to address immediate needs while fostering sustainable solutions.
- Provide training on good agricultural practices for post-harvest storage, flood crop protection, vegetable production and improved irrigation, along with guidance for fishers on securing their equipment before floods.
- Urgently fundraise to scale up food assistance in El Niño-impacted areas, as the lean season progresses and food insecurity deepens.
- Scale up social safety nets to protect vulnerable populations from livelihood losses, food insecurity, malnutrition and displacement.

West Africa and the Sahel

Mali

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, flooding, high prices

Widespread acute food insecurity is likely to worsen, with some populations in the north facing Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) levels of acute food insecurity, primarily driven by conflict and very high access constraints.

Conflict has escalated since the complete withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) at the end of 2023. In the first 6 months following the withdrawal, fatalities increased by 16 percent compared to the same period in 2023.[287] The trend is expected to continue during the outlook period, with the re-emergence of an insurgency by autonomist NSAGs in Kidal region likely to drive new displacements.[288] This will add to the 331 000 IDPs as of July 2024, further disrupting livelihoods and markets.[289]

The areas most severely affected by acute food insecurity are those experiencing ongoing blockades by NSAGs, which have worsened humanitarian access constraints since the withdrawal of MINUSMA.[290] According to the latest available projections from March 2024, an estimated 2 500 people in Ménaka were projected to face Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) levels of acute food insecurity during June–August 2024, while 121 000 people were projected to face Emergency (CH Phase 4) across Mopti, Gao, Tombouctou and Kidal.[291] Conflict-affected areas continue to report high levels of acute malnutrition, with GAM rates exceeding 15 percent among IDPs in Bamako, San, Ansongo and Menaka. By May 2024, more than 1.4 million children were estimated to be acutely malnourished, with Critical (AMN Phase 4) levels of acute malnutrition observed in the Gao and Ménaka regions.[292, 293]

Flash flooding is an additional concern in exacerbating food insecurity, driven by above-average rainfall in the September–October rainy season, compounded by La Niña conditions.[294, 295] Already, flooding in July–August resulted in the destruction of about 491 000 hectares of cropland, particularly in Segou, Djenné and Mopti.[296] By August, prices of key cereal staples – sorghum and millet – had risen by 50 and 58 percent, respectively, on a yearly basis across the country.[297, 298] Constrained access to agricultural inputs is expected to persist, limiting planting areas and yields, and putting further pressure on food availability.[299]

In total, around 1.37 million people were projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) in the country between June and August 2024.[300] While this marks a slight increase from the 1.26 million people in the same phase last year, these numbers are likely to worsen further during the outlook period, given intensifying conflict and resulting displacement.[301] Additionally, funding gaps are restricting humanitarian assistance.[302]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The HRP calls for USD 222.6 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 74.7 million for nutrition interventions.

- Provide emergency food and livelihood assistance, through cash and in-kind distributions, to populations in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), in localities where IDPs are concentrated.
- Deliver emergency nutritional assistance to vulnerable groups, including children and pregnant or breastfeeding women, as well as refugees, returnees, IDPs and host communities, through the distribution of nutritional supplements.
- Support destocking actions for vulnerable and internally displaced herders, to protect their livestock from the risk of loss due to conflict, along with providing livestock feed and inputs.
- Assist farmers in preparing for the next harvest, to safeguard production and limit crop losses through the distribution of storage equipment, particularly in areas at risk of displacement due to insecurity.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Other actions

- Enhance the systems for delivering anticipatory action and early warning, by strengthening national capacity to produce accurate forecasts for drought and flood responses, including the development of a trigger mechanism to facilitate the activation and implementation of anticipatory actions.

Burkina Faso

Key drivers of food insecurity: conflict, high food prices

Critical levels of acute food insecurity are likely to persist due to conflict and extreme access constraints, and their impacts on trade and agricultural activities.

Conflict is projected to intensify in the outlook period, with attacks by NSAGs and military operations adversely affecting livelihoods and food security, particularly in the north and east. Violent events increased by 22 percent in the second quarter of 2024, reversing the downward trend observed since 2023.[303] Access constraints remain extreme, with dozens of population centres under siege by NSAGs, including Djibo, which has been besieged since February 2022.[304] While the overall number of IDPs had stabilized at over 2.1 million as of July 2024, a renewed increase is anticipated during the outlook period.[305]

In addition to conflict, high food prices are further compounding food insecurity. Prices of key staples such as sorghum and millet were up 43 and 53 percent, respectively, in August 2024, year-on-year.[306] This reflects conflict-related market disruptions,[307] concerns over the performance of the 2024 rainy season in some areas, and strong local demand due to faster depletion of household stocks. Although some price decreases are expected with the start of the new harvest in October, cereal prices are likely to remain high. This is driven by reduced market supply, amid export restrictions in Ghana, and strong local demand, especially in areas with a high presence of IDPs and in urban areas.[308]

In the conflict-affected region of Liptako-Gourma, agricultural disruptions are expected to reduce crop production,[309] while dry spells have severely affected crop development in the Sud-Ouest region. A forecast of limited rainfall until mid-October is likely to further hinder crop recovery in these areas,[310] heightening concerns over food availability in these areas.

During the June–August 2024 lean season, more than 2.7 million people faced Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, including 423 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4), primarily concentrated in four northern and eastern provinces (Loroum, Soum, Oudalan and Komondjari). This figure, however, represents a significant decline from the 605 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) in 2023.[311] Updated figures are expected in the next CH analysis by December 2024. Acute malnutrition remains high, affecting 480 000 children and nearly 131 500 pregnant and breastfeeding women across 37 provinces between August 2023 and July 2024, and reaching above 10 percent in conflict-affected areas and among IDPs.[312]

RECOMMENDATIONS
Emergency response

The HRP calls for USD 368.9 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 55.4 million for nutrition interventions.

- Provide emergency food and livelihood assistance, through cash and in-kind distributions, to populations in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) in the northern and eastern provinces.
- Deliver emergency nutritional assistance to vulnerable groups, including children and pregnant or breastfeeding women, as well as refugees, returnees, IDPs and host communities, through the distribution of nutritional supplements.
- Support IDPs and host communities by reconstituting small ruminants as sources of income-generating activities, while providing livestock feed and necessary inputs to ensure sustainability.
- Assist farmers in preparing for the next harvest to safeguard production and limit crop losses, through the distribution of storage equipment, particularly in areas at risk of displacement due to insecurity.
- Enhance the availability of nutritious food in hard-to-reach areas, by supporting households with home gardening through the distribution of short-cycle seeds and essential tools.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Other actions

- Implement water-mobilization infrastructure to enable year-round agricultural production and enhance resilience to climate variability.

Chad

Key drivers of food insecurity: refugee influx, insecurity, flooding, economic deterioration

Acute food insecurity is expected to deteriorate further, driven by the continued influx of people fleeing conflict in the Sudan, conflict and insecurity, flooding and high food prices.

The persisting conflict in the Sudan is expected to lead to a continued inflow of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees, with potential new spikes in arrivals anticipated after the end of the rainy season in October. As of early September, total arrivals reached 854 000, concentrated mainly in the Ouaddaï, Sila and Wadi Fira regions. The Chadian government estimates this number could rise to 910 000 by the end of 2024,[313] placing additional strain on livelihoods and food stocks in host communities and driving up humanitarian needs.[314]

In the Lac region, conflict and insecurity persist,[315] with fatalities rising from January to August 2024 compared to the same period in 2023.[316] Ongoing violence continues to cause displacement, disrupt agricultural activities and limit employment opportunities. The suspension of humanitarian assistance to IDPs since April 2024, due to funding shortfalls, has further compounded vulnerabilities, likely resulting in low household incomes and increased competition for scarce resources.[317]

The 2024 cereal harvest, to be gathered between September and December, is forecast at below-average levels on account of reduced plantings, high costs of agricultural inputs and widespread floods in August and September, which affected 1.9 million people, as of early October, and caused the loss of 356 000 hectares of cropland.[318, 319, 320, 321] In addition, the current river levels in 2024 are higher than those observed in both 2022 and 2023, indicating a heightened risk of riverine flooding.[322]

High cereal prices, which reached record levels in July 2024, are expected to remain elevated due to local production shortfalls, high transport costs, limited imports and strong local demand, especially in refugee-hosting areas.[323]

An estimated 3.4 million Chadian residents (20 percent of the population) faced Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity during the June–August 2024 lean season, including 534 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).[324] This represents a 7-percentage-point increase in the population in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) compared to the same period in 2023.[325] Among refugees and returnees, around 420 000 people (34 percent of the analysed population) were projected to face Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity, including 122 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).[326] Additionally, over 58 000 children under 5 years of age are expected to experience elevated levels of acute malnutrition in 2024.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The HRP calls for USD 146 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 157.5 million for nutrition interventions.

- Provide emergency food and livelihood assistance, through cash and in-kind distributions, to populations in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) in areas severely affected by floods, targeting refugees, returnees, IDPs and host communities.
- Deliver emergency nutritional assistance to vulnerable groups, including children and pregnant or breastfeeding women, as well as refugees, returnees, IDPs and host communities, through the distribution of nutritional supplements.
- Support livelihood restoration in the Lac, Mayo Kebbii Est, Mandoul, Tandjilé and Batha regions, by providing cash assistance, implementing cash-for-work programmes to rehabilitate infrastructure and damaged land, and distributing farming equipment and inputs to households with cash+ support for off-season cultivation.
- Protect and reconstitute livestock, through the distribution of small ruminants, and support animal-health interventions such as vaccination and deworming.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Other actions

- Scale up alternative and complementary supply chain corridors through Libya and Nigeria, as well as by rail from Douala.

Niger

Key drivers of food insecurity: floods, economic deterioration

Acute food insecurity is expected to worsen due to the impact of widespread floods and a deteriorating macroeconomic environment.

Heavy rains beginning in May have caused the worst flooding in the country since 2020,[327] affecting 1.3 million people as of the end of September 2024.[328] The floods have severely disrupted livelihoods by causing significant crops losses and damage to assets, and affected market activities, exacerbating acute food insecurity across the country. Of particular concern is the situation in the conflict-affected regions of Tillabéri, Tahoua, Diffa and Maradi, where floods have triggered new internal displacements, further driving humanitarian needs.[329] In July 2024, the total number of IDPs rose by 25 percent from the previous month. By August 2024, the number of IDPs had reached approximately 507 500 – representing a 25 percent increase compared to August 2023 – with 78 percent located in the Tillabéri and Diffa regions.[330, 331]

Food prices remain elevated, with prices of sorghum and millet – the most consumed cereals – up to 47 and 61 percent higher year-on-year in September 2024.[332] These high prices are driven by the lingering effects of the cereal national production deficit for 2023, sanctions by the Economic Community of West African States, trade restrictions with Benin, flood-induced disruptions to market supply routes, and high transport costs compounded by conflict-related market disruptions.[333, 334] A continued closure of the Benin border is expected to further reduce food imports during the outlook period,[335] as the Niger is highly dependent on the Benin corridor for its cereal supply, and this would also decrease export revenues,[336] limiting food access amid constrained foreign aid.[337] With the 2024 harvest, expected to improve over last year, millet and sorghum prices were set to seasonally decline from October.

An estimated 3.4 million people (13 percent of the analysed population) faced high levels of acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above) during the June to August 2024 lean season, including 126 000 people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).[338] This marks a slight increase compared to the same period in 2023, when 3.3 million people were assessed to be in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) levels of acute food insecurity.[339] However, actual numbers for the 2024 lean season are likely to be higher than March 2024 projections due to the severe impact of the floods.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The 2024 HRP calls for USD 204.3 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 77 million for nutrition interventions.

- Provide cash assistance targeting flood-affected households to support their immediate food security needs.
- Assist vulnerable households reliant on off-season crops to recover from the loss of their main agricultural production.
- Provide small ruminants to households that have suffered significant livestock losses to help them rebuild their herds.
- Implement veterinary health programmes in villages to prevent disease outbreaks among livestock following the flooding.

Nigeria

Key drivers of food insecurity: economic deterioration, conflict, flooding

Acute food insecurity is likely to deteriorate due to the poor macroeconomic situation, heightened insecurity, flooding and reduced agricultural production.

The security situation has worsened, with violent incidents rising by 26 percent nationwide from January to August 2024 compared to the same period in 2023,[340] while the number of IDPs remains high, estimated at 3.6 million as of July 2024.[341] Conflict is concentrated in the northern regions, severely constraining farmers' access to land and disrupting markets.[342] Rising banditry and intercommunal tensions are anticipated in the northwest and north-central states after the end of the rainy season in October, exacerbated by poor economic conditions.[343] Humanitarian access has deteriorated in northern areas and remains severely limited in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states,[344] further compounded by funding gaps affecting assistance delivery.[345]

Headline inflation remains close to its highest levels in 28 years, estimated at 32.2 percent in August 2024.[346] The prices of cereal staples were more than twice their year-earlier levels in July 2024.[347]

Persistent fuel scarcity, a weak currency and likely reduced 2024 cereal output are expected to keep inflation elevated.[348]

Prospects for the 2024 main cereal harvest have been impacted by high input prices and adverse weather between July and September,[349] including dry spells in southern areas and severe flooding in the north.[350] As of mid-September, floods impacted over 727 000 hectares of cropland and 1.1 million people,[351] worsening already high levels of acute food insecurity.[352] The situation could deteriorate further if the forecasted La Niña-related above-average rainfall for October and November materializes, raising the risk of flooding along the Niger River.[353]

Nearly 31.8 million people (16 percent of the analysed population) were estimated to face Crisis or worse acute food insecurity (CH Phase 3 or above) during the June–August 2024 lean season, including almost 1 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4).[354] This represents a 3-percentage-point increase in the number of acutely food insecure people compared to the same period in 2023.[355] Acute malnutrition levels remain high, exceeding 10 percent in Borno, Yobe, Sokota, Katsina and Zamfara, with 4.4 million children and 585 000 pregnant and breastfeeding women projected to be acutely malnourished in 2024.[356]

RECOMMENDATIONS

Emergency response

The HRP calls for USD 367.9 million for food security and livelihoods, and USD 112.7 million for nutrition interventions.

- Provide emergency food and livelihood assistance, through cash and in-kind distributions, to populations in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above), as well as to vulnerable households in urban areas facing challenges accessing food due to high inflation.
- Scale up emergency agricultural interventions, through dry-season input distributions to vulnerable households with access to water for production, to boost household food production and income generation.
- Deliver emergency nutritional assistance to vulnerable groups, including children and pregnant or breastfeeding women, IDPs and host communities, through the distribution of nutritional complements.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Other actions

- Strategically pre-position stocks of food in Rann, Kala-Balge Local Government Area, Borno State, in response to potential new emergencies, including displacement, returns and flooding.

Glossary

Acute food insecurity

Acute food insecurity is any manifestation of food deprivation that threatens lives or livelihoods regardless of the causes, context or duration. The IPC/CH Acute Food Insecurity scale categorizes acute food insecurity into five phases of severity, ranging from IPC/CH Phase 1, corresponding to No/Minimal acute food insecurity, to IPC/CH Phase 5, corresponding to Catastrophe/Famine. Each of these phases has important and distinct implications for where and how best to intervene.

Chronic food insecurity

Chronic food security refers to food insecurity that persists over time, largely due to structural causes. Chronic food insecurity has relevance in providing strategic guidance to actions that focus on the medium- and long-term improvement of the quality and quantity of food consumption required for an active and healthy life.

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)

The IPC results from a partnership of various organizations at the global, regional and country levels, and is widely accepted by the international community as a global reference for the classification of food insecurity.

Cadre Harmonisé (CH)

The Cadre Harmonisé is the multidimensional analytical framework used by the Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), for the analysis and identification of areas and groups at risk of acute food insecurity in the Sahel, West Africa and Cameroon.

Emergency – IPC/CH Phase 4 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) is a level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale at which households either have large food-consumption gaps – which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality – or are able to mitigate large food-consumption gaps by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. Households face critical levels of acute food insecurity/critical acute food insecurity. Urgent action is needed to save lives and livelihoods. If nothing is done, the population could face starvation or death.

Catastrophe – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) is a level of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale at which households face an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs, even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. Urgent, immediate action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death, and the total collapse of livelihoods. Households can be in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) even if areas are not classified in Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5).

Famine – IPC/CH Phase 5 of the Acute Food Insecurity Scale

Famine is the highest level of the Acute Food Insecurity scale. Famine exists in areas where at least one in five households has, or is most likely to have, an extreme deprivation of food and face starvation, death, destitution. Extremely Critical levels of acute malnutrition (at least 30 percent of children malnourished) and significant mortality, directly attributable to outright starvation or to the interaction of malnutrition and disease (at least 1 person for every 5 000 dies each day), are occurring. Urgent action is needed to stop widespread starvation and death.

Risk of Famine

Risk of Famine refers to the reasonable probability of an area going into Famine in the projected period. While this is not perceived necessarily as the most-likely scenario, it is a worst-case scenario that generally has a realistic chance of occurring.

Food security

A situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. There are usually four dimensions of food security: food availability, food access, food utilization and stability over time.

Food access

Access by households/individuals to adequate resources for acquiring appropriate foods for a nutritious diet.

Food availability

The availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports.

Livelihoods

People's capabilities, assets – both material and social – and activities required for a means of living linked to survival and future well-being; and the policies and institutions that shape or constrain access to assets and choices about activities.

Coping strategies

Activities to which people resort in order to obtain food, income and/or other essential goods or services when their normal means of livelihood have been disrupted or other shocks/hazards affect their access to basic needs.

Malnutrition

Malnutrition is an umbrella term that covers undernutrition and overweight, obesity and diet-related non-communicable diseases such as heart disease, stroke, diabetes and cancer. Undernutrition is a consequence of inadequate nutrient intake and/or absorption, and/or illness or disease. Acute malnutrition, stunting, underweight and micronutrient deficiencies are all forms of undernutrition.

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Global Network Against Food Crises
INTEGRATED ACTIONS FOR LASTING SOLUTIONS

The Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) is a multistakeholder initiative of humanitarian and development actors, united by a commitment to tackle the root causes of food crises and to promote sustainable solutions. GNAFC produces and shares analyses and knowledge, and strengthens the coordination of evidence-based responses across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus. It operates at national, regional, and global levels.

Within GNAFC's approach and framework, FAO and WFP, together with relevant partners, have established a coordinated monitoring system for food security, livelihoods and value chains in order to identify and inform critical anticipatory actions.

This report is part of a series of GNAFC's analytical products contributing to the generation and sharing of consensus and evidence-based information for preventing and addressing food crises.

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